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Introduction
The perspective assumed here is determined by two main points of inter-
ests: the theory of culture and particular field of the cultural analysis of 
music. The former will remain a central topic, while the latter will come 
into question only marginally, although searching for tools allowing for 
better explanation of specific phenomena of musical culture is my main 
and personal motivation.
Anybody who deals with culture, as long as he or she is not blinded 
by some kind of theoretical dogma or prejudice, meets time as the nec-
essary dimension of every cultural process. We use the word “history” to 
name a way in which a scholar of human affairs deals with time. Theory 
of culture then is always lurking on the border of history and vice versa. 
This crossing has some bad tradition though, founded mainly by Philipp 
Bagby: the theoretician considers history to be not ordered enough, not 
enough suited to the particular needs of theory, not theoretical enough. In 
effect this theoretician feels obliged to instruct the historian how history 
should be “properly” practiced. 
Here I assume exactly the opposite strategy. The theoretical aspect of 
history is, I believe, deep and effective, and it lies in a multitude of impor-
tant theoretical consequences of the historian’s work. I’m not searching, 
then, for “proper” or “correct” model of history. Everything’s all right with 
history. Instead I’d like to examine the said consequences of historians’ 
ideas for a theoretical understanding of culture. To confront theory and 
the history of culture is of course not an astonishingly new idea, although 
such a confrontation rarely has followed the line I have proposed above. 
This is but a kind of work that needs to be periodically taken anew: without 
searching for theoretical consequences, the potential of history cannot be 
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fully realized, just like theory of culture not grounded in history is always 
in danger of degenerating into a set of empty conceptual operations. Such 
a confrontation must of course start with probably the most influential his-
toriographic tradition of the last century: the French history of mentality. 
Chapter 1
Troubles with “mentality”  
and historians badmouthing theory
At the end of the previous century Robert Darnton1 summarized up the 
main theoretical dilemma haunting the historical research based on the 
idea of “mentality,” detectable especially in the French tradition of “An-
nales.” In conclusion he proposed to substitute the concept of “mentality ” 
with the concept of “culture.” Darnton actually meant a very specific 
concept of culture, i.e. Clifford Geertz’s “semiotic theory of culture.” Yet 
the differences dividing Geertz’s proposition and many concepts of “men-
tality,” starting from Lucien Lévy-Bruhl and following the line up to the 
French historians of 1980s, are serious enough to provoke questions. Is 
Darnton’s choice really so obvious? The problem can gain some clarity if 
we will confront three concepts usually used to organize scholarly activity 
within the history of culture: mentality, the image of the world (treated as 
a critical counterproposition to the concept of mentality, one that came 
from within history itself) and the concept of culture. Such a confrontation 
should also have consequences for basic assumptions that some of Polish 
cultural theoreticians – including myself – tend to follow, and maybe allow 
to correct these assumptions to make them more effective in dealing with 
the temporal aspect of cultural phenomena.
The concept of “mentality” is in constant use – and under equally 
constant critique – starting with the 1920 up to today, but it has never 
1 R. Darnton, The Kiss of Lamourette. Reflections in Cultural History, W. W. Norton, 
New York 1990.
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been theoretically unified and elucidated in an actually ordered manner. 
Many of existing publications on this topic, and there’s quite a few of them, 
come from the historians’ workshop and deal with the detailed problems 
of source interpretation, etc., not having any intention to theoretically 
generalize the problem of “mentality” itself. There are probably two main 
reasons for this. First, there is a kind of antipathy to any theory shared by 
many historians and not without a solid justification. This antipathy has 
been generally overcome during the debate on narrativism, when avoiding 
theory for any longer threatened an inability to recognize the presumptions 
and implicit strategies of one’s own scholarly practice. Before the narrativ-
istic breakthrough though, any effort aiming for a systematic, theoretical 
ordering of history was usually suspected of a more or less evident resti-
tution of the “positivist” nomothetic model of history. Along with some 
extreme forms of positivism, such a model has always been mistrusted by 
historians, and even in the philosophy of history, after the decomposition 
of Hempel’s model of nomothetic history, it did not receive a good press. 
And when the “theory of history” was not suspected of nomothetism of 
this kind, it was still suspected of “historiosophy,” and usually for a rea-
son. Suspicions of this kind did good work, making every historian, and 
in fact every scholar of human matters, fully aware of the dangers that 
come, when one interprets historical sources or human behaviour in the 
light of philosophical and theoretical assumptions, taken a priori in the 
name of systematic coherence or even personal beliefs (political, social, 
religious, etc.). Lucien Febvre expressed this kind of mistrust with rhetor-
ical emphasis in his famous motto, ascribed to him at least anecdotally: 
“Philosophizing is the capital crime of a historian.”
The second reason that probably worked against the theoretical elab-
oration of the concept of mentality as a historical idea, is connected with 
the fact that the concept itself has been borrowed by historians from other 
disciplines, i.e. ethnology, sociology and social psychology, for it could 
be then treated as obvious and not needing any additional elucidation. 
Especially ethnological theory by Lucien Lévy-Bruhl2 proved to be influ-
ential amongst historians. 
But during the last decades both reasons that made the theory of 
mentality not necessarily needed by historians, changed their status and 
we cannot now look at them in the way Lucien Febvre, for example, did.
2 L. Lévy-Bruhl, Primitive Mentality, Allen – Unwin, London 1923.
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There are a few serious obstacles that disallow to continue today the 
traditional, historical antipathy for theory – some of them coming from 
history itself, many recognized during the last few decades in the general 
field of the humanities. It was decades ago, when Marc Bloch,3 analyzing 
the methods of interpreting history, pointed out that the historian’s ques-
tionnaire and unavoidable (even if minimal) set of his assumptions is, so 
to say, “shaping ahead” every possible historical knowledge. Bloch’s work 
was quite disillusioning with respect to Ranke’s belief, shared by most of 
historians, that it’s their only aim to describe past events wie es eigentlich 
gewesen. In a famous comparison Bloch treated historical facts, estab-
lished thanks to the analysis of sources, as bricks, used to construct the 
building we call “historical knowledge.” And we do construct it according 
to architectonical rules that cannot be simply deduced from the qualities 
of the bricks themselves. To put it less figuratively: writing history is the 
activity governed by structural rules that predetermine possible connec-
tions between the facts, the hierarchy of their importance, relevance to 
historian’s questions, etc. According to Bloch, then, history is not simply 
describing the past, but interrogates its traces from a point of view that is 
belonging not to the past itself, but to the time of the historian. History 
is the interaction between the past and the present, and the past itself is 
something constructed. This construction will change, following changes 
in the historian’s own interests. The development of historical knowledge 
cannot be then considered fully progressive or even cumulative: it consists 
of changing complementary perspectives; history not only deals with time, 
it is itself the effect of time. So not the autonomous, “authentic” shape of the 
past is determining historical knowledge, but our contemporary questions 
and interests, i.e. the shape of our present. Or to put this in another way: 
there is interaction between our present and their present, because every 
part of our past was somebody’s present. This is what Bloch called “the 
structural interdependence of ages.” It changes history from a “knowledge 
of the past” into the “knowledge of human beings in time.”
This is of course the constructivist’s interpretation of Bloch’s view, 
which shouldn’t go too far. Continuing the architectonical metaphor, we 
can say that even if the qualities of the building cannot be simply deduced 
from the material used, the material remains meaningful, nevertheless. 
At least, it determines what kind of construction is possible and what kind 
3 M. Bloch, The Historian’s Craft, Alfred A. Knopf, New York 1953.
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is not. The role of fact in history can be treated in a similar way: the set 
of known facts limits the field of possible historical constructions, even 
if we do construct them according to many other factors, some of them 
indicated above.
If during the 1930s and 1940s Bloch managed to describe the char-
acter of historical knowledge as something constructed according to 
other-than-factual cognitive agents, then during the late 1970s Hayden 
White4 in a spectacular way pointed out the consequences of the fact that 
history is inevitably written. Written history deals with all the problems 
of linguistic and aesthetic representation. Critical responses to White’s 
Metahistory, just like the analogous if slightly later responses to Narrative 
Logic by Frank Ankersmit,5 are widely known. They became especial-
ly fierce during the 1990s and after 2000. Still, the critique was aimed 
mainly at some extreme interpretations of narrativism, inspired less by 
White and Ankersmit than by – if we can transform Wolfgang Welsch’s 
term – “journalists’ postmodernism.” There were also more problems 
with some details of narrativist theories than with basic discoveries. One 
can, of course, reject White’s idea of founding the poetics of historical 
writing on Northrop Frye’s theory of tropes. Still it does not disqualify 
the general thesis that history – being something shaped in language – is 
governed not only by theoretical presumptions, indicated by Bloch, but 
also by the specific forms of poetics. It’s hard to deny that history has its 
poetics. The tempered thesis of narrativism, formulated after all the critical 
response, could be expressed like this: at least some part of connections 
and relations between the events and processes described by the historian 
is not causal, functional, etc., but come from literary rules of narrating; the 
understanding that we gain thanks to historical knowledge, is then at least 
partially dependant on the specifics of the literary means of representation, 
means that are poetical or rhetorical and that can’t be eliminated from the 
text of history; any historical representation of the past includes elements 
of aesthetic representation. These theses stand firm even if we reject the 
solutions of particular problems proposed by White or Ankersmit. His-
torians were aware of these problems much earlier anyway, for example 
the function of aesthetics in historical representation of the past was 
4 H. White, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth Century Europe, The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore 1973.
5 F. Ankersmit, Narrative Logic: A Semantic Analysis of the Historian’s Language, Mar-
tinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague 1983.
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fully recognized, starting with Johannes Huizinga. But it was thanks to 
the effort of the narrativist philosophers of history during the 1970s and 
1980s that these problems were moved into the nexus of epistemological 
debate. The topic was, of course, continued by many more scholars, like 
Jerzy Topolski6 or Paul Veyne.7
Both the historians’ self-analysis and philosophical debate made it clear 
that there is an intricate web of theoretical and rhetorical factors, modifying 
or even constructing historical knowledge. Febvre’s famous motto cannot 
be repeated today. Philosophizing arose from “historian’s first crime” to the 
position, exaggerating only slightly, of the historian’s obligation. At least, 
this is so if a historian doesn’t want his or her knowledge to become the 
playing field for unrecognized and then uncontrolled factors and preju-
dices of many kinds. Regarding the history of culture, the whole of this 
situation indicates the necessity of crossing the line between history and 
the theory of culture, going towards scholarly disciplines specialized in the-
oretical problems, like philosophy and anthropology. On the other hand, 
no cultural theoretician can neglect the temporal aspect of the human 
phenomena and the crucial problem of change. This means crossing the 
line between history and theory in the opposite direction and becoming 
a historian of a kind. The two disciplines inevitably intertwine and lose 
their borders.
There have been other analogous impulses, coming from many plac-
es, above all from other fields of the humanities and social sciences, 
strengthening the tendency to “theorize” history. The perspectivism of 
every meaning-creation process and every interpretation, the including 
interpretation of historical sources, has been indicated in the 19th century 
by Friedrich Nietzsche.8 Nietzsche’s theory of cognitive perspectivism can 
be elucidated as a conjunction of two basic statements: that every interpre-
tation engages a particular point of view, i.e. that every interpretation is 
situated against some particular system of values and interests (up to the 
broadest one: the perspective of Homo sapiens, determined by biological 
evolution – the broadest but still particular); that every act of determining 
6 J. Topolski, Jak się pisze i rozumie historię. Tajemnice narracji historycznej, Oficyna 
Wydawnicza Rytm, Warsaw 1996.
7 P. Veyne, Writing History: Essay on Epistemology, Manchester University Press, Man-
chester 1984.
8 F. Nietzsche, On Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral Sense, in The Birth of Tragedy and 
Other Writings, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1999.
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meaning is also the act of valuation, depending on the previously assumed 
interpretational perspective. 
Many ways of understanding the status of knowledge, including the 
historical one, proposed during the 20th century were – in this way or 
another – indebted to Nietzsche. Nietzsche’s heritage is especially im-
portant for psychoanalytical interpretations and for scholars following 
Michel Foucault – to name but a few, who openly admitted their debt. 
Although the theories of history proposed by Foucault or Dominick LaCa-
pra are detailed and thoroughly worked out, they still remain within the 
intellectual horizon opened up by Nietzsche. Even the interpretation of 
the construction of historical knowledge construction according to class 
interests, typical for Marxist historiography, can be understood as a form 
of perspectivism, although originally independent of Nietzsche. To accept 
this point of view means to accept the belief that every possible aspect of 
historical knowledge is involved in an intricate web of interests, which can 
be only brought to light by critical thinking (of many shapes: from Freud 
to Gramsci). We can express this in a language similar to the statements of 
the German philosophical school of Frankfurt: the theoretical awareness 
has only one alternative: naive and unaware ideology. We could point out 
many philosophical concepts following this path, from the critical theory 
of society up to deconstructivism, but for our needs indicating the main 
tendency should be sufficient enough. 
From today’s perspective, then, history without historiosophy seems 
no longer possible, it would be only a history unaware of its implied his-
toriosophy. Antitheoretical inclinations, inherited from one of the forms 
of philosophical positivism, and strengthened by some forms of recent 
nominalism (recognized by the Polish philosopher Leszek Nowak as a kind 
of neo-neopositivism under the misleading name of “postmodernism”9), 
fruits not with disengaged and neutral knowledge, but with a knowledge 
that naively absolutizes its own involvement in interests, unaware of its 
theoretical categories and literate strategies. There’s no reason, then, to 
not interrogate the history of mentality from the perspective of its theory. 
There is also no reason to avoid the theoretical history of culture in general.
9 L. Nowak, Byt i myśl. U podstaw negatywistycznej metafizyki unitarnej, vol. I: Nicość 
i istnienie, Zysk i S-ka, Poznan 1998.
Chapter 2
Troubles with mentality:  
status of the concept
If the concept of mentality, central the most influential tradition of cul-
tural history in the 20th century, has been borrowed from outside history, 
why should the historian look any elaborations on it different than those 
proposed in psychology or ethnology? Ethnologists, after strong criticism, 
generally rejected Lucien Lévy-Bruhl’s theory of “primitive mentality” 
and with it also the concept of mentality itself. Its place was taken by 
the concept of culture or even the much broader concept of society. The 
criticism toward Lévy-Bruhl included the belief that no society projects 
a  unified mentality and concepts like “primitive mentality” artificially 
and arbitrarily generalize heterogeneous phenomena, and the belief 
that social and cultural phenomena, that are group phenomena, can’t be 
explained by categories borrowed from individual psychology. Some of 
these accusations reappeared decades later in the critical discourse on 
the contemporary history of mentality. In the field of social psychology, 
similarly, neverminding the great career of the concept of mentality in the 
time of Maurice Blondel and Henri Walon, the concept has been largely 
abandoned, as not differentiated enough and much too unclear. Contem-
porary social psychology, for example in Pilip Zimbardo’s version, does 
fine without the concept of the collective mentality. In fact it was decades 
ago when historians with their category of “mentality” were left alone. 
The problem is that this stubborn use of a generally abandoned concept 
was not any kind of intellectual regress: during the years of its being in use, 
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the word “mentality” gained in history very specific set of meanings. This 
specific historians’ “mentality,” although widely commented on, discussed 
and “remarked” was never – as far as I know – systematically analyzed 
and elucidated, but usually reduced to some kind of psychological con-
sideration. The range of this category is usually not covered by alternative 
propositions, even by Clifford Geertz’s concept of culture proposed by 
Darnton in place of “mentality.” In fact, as we will see, it is these that are 
the concepts of cultural theory, if they are to deal with what historians 
call “mentality,” that may need to be revised.
Describing the content of the “mentality” concept, as it was shaped 
during decades of historical inquiry, is not an easy task. The presentation 
of a set of exemplary concepts that were already used as equivalents or 
specifications to the concept of “mentality” may prove to be the most 
efficient way. Such a concept as mentality includes, among others, ideas 
of a social consciousness, collective mentality, mental equipment and 
image of the world. Some of them were even treated as synonymous to 
“mentality,” more or less precisely.
The two first categories above, i.e. social consciousness and collective 
mentality, belong to classic theories. Social (or collective) consciousness 
is the term borrowed for the history of culture from Émile Durkheim’s 
sociology.1 It denotes a kind of cognitive reality and may be elucidated as 
an aggregation of judgments, including factual statements and valuating 
judgments. This concept doesn’t provoke any ontological doubts, because 
it doesn’t establish any new sphere or level of reality. Social consciousness 
is not levitating over individuals’ heads, but consists of beliefs that are 
shared by individuals. This aggregation of beliefs could be even defined 
according to the terms of mathematical set theory to avoid any misunder-
standings. To express it otherwise: we do not need to assume any kind of 
separate cognitive sphere of reality (of a special ontological status), but only 
a simple fact that some people may share the beliefs of some other people. 
The content of social consciousness can be, then, determined empirically.
The coherence and importance of the collective consciousness depends 
heavily on – in Durkheim’s terms – the type of solidarity, characterizing 
the given group. In the society of mechanical solidarity the collective 
consciousness, especially the obligation to share evaluating judgements, 
functions as the “social adhesive” and the criterion of identity. The coher-
1 É. Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society, Free Press, New York 1997.
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ence of such a society requires, then, developed techniques of “ideological” 
control and also an expanded system of punishments, associated with any 
kind of non-conformism. In societies of organic solidarity, coherence 
and effectiveness is assured by functional dependencies, created by the 
social division of labour. The real threat to such a society doesn’t lie in 
the refusal of judgement-sharing but in the refusal of participating in the 
labour-organization system.
Collective consciousness is – in societies of organic solidarity or, to put 
it in the language of another theory, of functional integrity – of secondary 
importance, up to the possibility of its decomposition. This possibility was 
described by Jerzy Kmita as the project of society deprived of axiological 
symbolization.2 This kind of deprivation implies the possibility of com-
plete decomposition of the set of shared values of the society, replaced 
by functional relations and only communicative symbolization (which 
is, of course, functionally necessary). Even if we remember that pure 
mechanical and organic solidarity can be only understood as ideal types 
and every real society employs both types of solidarity to a different extent 
and in different proportions, it’s easy to recognize a tendency typical for 
industrialized societies, leading to the replacement of mechanical relations 
with organic ones. For any history of culture or history of mentality that 
accepts Durkheim’s categories, it implies a risky methodological situation. 
The more industrialized (or post-industrialized) the society, the less such 
a history of this society is even possible and the less it explains (because the 
inquired sphere of shared statements and values is of lesser and lesser social 
importance). This problem is somehow omitted if instead of Durkheim’s 
concept of social consciousness we apply the idea of collective mentality.
“Collective mentality” is exactly the term that was borrowed by histori-
ans from psychology and ethnology. In the latter case it denotes a mental 
pattern or general psychological configuration belonging to some society. 
Some anthropologists accepted such an idea as a supplement to the gen-
erally accepted theory of behavioural patterns (following the example of 
Ruth Benedict3). The mental pattern can be also alternatively described 
as the aggregate of formal patterns of reasoning, styles of thinking, recog-
nized types of relations between things, etc., accepted by a given society. 
2 J. Kmita, Jak słowa łączą się ze światem: studium krytyczne neopragmatyzmu, Wyd. 
Naukowe Instytutu Filozofii UAM w Poznaniu, Poznan 1998.
3 R. Benedict, Patterns of Culture, Houghton Miffin Company, Boston – New York 
1934.
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Hypothetically some societies may accept only logical relations, while 
other may accept only metaphorical connections. The inquiry into these 
problems branches back at least to James Frazer4 and his differentiation 
of magic, science and religion as three separate systems of thinking, based 
on rules specific for them only. Today’s ethnological solution to similar 
problems differ from Frazer’s in this respect, as they no longer assume the 
idea of progressivism, tending to replace it with a vision of a multitude of 
incomparable “styles of rationality,” to use Peter Winch’s5 term. 
Explained in this way, the concept of mental patterns provokes some 
kind of reductionism, reducing “mental” to its cognitive element, while 
historians of mentality (and Benedict, Margaret Mead or Lévy-Bruhl before 
them) included also socially shared patterns of feelings or emotional reac-
tions. Some of the most famous studies in history of mentality deal with 
the history of love, fear, etc. One could, of course, doubt if, for example, 
Jean Delumeau managed to write true a history of fear in the culture of 
the West,6 insisting that it is in fact a history of the ways in which fear was 
socially imagined and communicated – history of the semiotics of fear, 
not the history of fear itself. This point of view has been openly assumed 
by Niklas Luhmann in his Love: A Sketch.7 There is then a solid reason to 
ask if the history of emotions is even possible, if the hermeneutic approach 
of historian (necessarily hermeneutic, because there will never be any 
participating observation of past events) always deals with things already 
mediated by semiotics and somehow communicated. We will come back 
to this dilemma yet, for now, it’s enough to point out, that the idea of the 
collective mentality implies more than only cognitive patterns.
Of course, such a category may raise many more doubts than Durk-
heim’s ideas. What exactly collective can the mentality be? What can it 
denote? It’s easy to understand what does it mean to share beliefs; we can 
comprehend even how the “styles of rationality” can be shared, thanks to 
enculturation and then accepting and rejecting utterances according to 
how they with the accepted pattern. Still, what does it mean to say the 
4 J. Frazer, The Golden Bough: A Study in Magic and Religion, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford 1998.
5 P. Winch, Understanding a Primitive Society, “American Philosophical Quarterly” 
I (1964).
6 J. Delumeau, Sin and Fear: The Emergence of the Western Guilt Culture 13th–18th cen-
turies, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke 1990.
7 N. Luhmann, Love: A Sketch, Polity, Cambridge 2010.
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people in 13th century Europe loved differently than they did in the 19th 
century? How exactly should we understand the statement that there’s 
a social pattern of how we do fear? There always were many doubts and 
even a lot of sarcasm about “collective mentality.” And this is hardly 
surprising. It was suspected of metaphysics, i.e. of introducing a separate 
ontological level of unclear status and hardly convincing necessity (up to 
Carl Gustav Jung’s “collective unconsciousness”), and of “multiplying 
the entities,” i.e. avoiding the “Occam’s razor.” It was also suspected of an 
unreasonable yet total “culturization” (or socialization) of human beings, 
annihilating any individual aspect of existence, even in respect to emo-
tions, and of hiding (intentionally or unintended) the differentiated and 
often conflicting character of people’s mental approaches. And no doubt: 
for example neglecting the difference between primal emotion (shaped 
by biological evolution) and secondary emotions (shaped by society) was 
not the proof of wisdom. Shame, as an emotion socioculturally produced, 
undoubtedly has its history, but again: how can a primal emotion like fear 
have a history other than told by biologists? Rejection of the history of 
primal emotions does not render books like Jean Delumeau’s unimportant, 
but forces a question about their exact subject-matter. Finally, the concept 
of collective mentality has been denounced as notoriously unclear, a kind 
of conceptual sack, where one can put anything one manages to find. It is 
hard to call any of these doubts unfounded.
In the history of mentality, as it was, and more often than not still is 
actually practiced, the mentality itself usually denotes a conjunction of 
social consciousness, mental patterns and emotional characteristics. The 
obscurity of the basic concept and its doubtful coherence should provoke 
some serious theoretical work. One can easily share the irritation of some 
historians used to theoretical discipline, for example coming from the field 
of anthropology, like Darnton. But there is still one factor that disallows 
the rejection of the idea of “mentality”: clear or unclear, conceptual sack 
or not, it has mothered dozens and hundreds of the most influential, 
innovative and enlightening studies in history that have come through 
the last century. It basically proved to be effective. It was the fundamen-
tal tool of some of the greatest achievements in modern historiography. 
It’s sheer effectiveness demands rather improvement than rejection, and 
historians are fully aware of this – which is why they proposed certain 
concepts that were supposed to solve the problems: mental equipment 
and image of the world. 

Chapter 3
Explaining the mentality:  
mental equipment  
and image of the world
The concept of outillage mental played the crucial role in the enterprise 
undertaken by Lucien Febvre in his Problem of disbelief in the 16th century: 
The Religion of Rabelais,1 the book that can be considered a kind of coun-
terpoint of the famous book on François Rabelais by Mikhail Bakhtin.2 
The concept it presents differs significantly from the concept of collective 
mentality in one important point. While most historians of mentality un-
derstood and sometimes still understand mental patterns as a determining 
factor (the factor that regulates mental acts), the author of Problem of 
disbelief interpreted them as tools. We can say, then, that the vision of the 
individual as something strictly determined by collective mental patterns 
(a vision criticized so many times and so fiercely) has been replaced by 
Febvre with the vision of the active and creative individual, who uses the 
collective mental patterns as tools at hand. This kind of equipment, we 
can imagine today, contains not only concepts and categories but also 
patterns of reasoning and rules of their transformation. But how an actual 
transformation will proceed, how far will it reach, depends in large part 
on the initiative of the individual. Mental equipment doesn’t determine 
the way we think or experience the world; but it determines the borders 
of our creative autonomy, and limits possible transformations and ways 
1 L. Febvre, Problem of disbelief in the 16th century: The Religion of Rabelais, Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge – New York – London 1985.
2 M. Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World, Indiana University Press, Bloomington 1984.
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of thinking in a way in which other tools limit what can be done with 
them. The possible uses of such tools are probably wide enough to be not 
exhausted by any actual, historical society. The study of mental equipment 
never allows to answer questions like “why did Rabelais think in the way 
he did?” Instead it promotes different and much more important questions 
that truly opens the understanding of his work: what was possible and 
what was not for the 16th century French writer, what kind of intellectual 
tools he had at his disposal, what was the limit for his thinking and act-
ing set by given configuration of outillage mental? Febvre answers: in the 
world of Rabelais the thesis of atheism was such a limit – not the doubt, 
sacrilege, blasphemy, rebellion, rejection, hatred toward priests or even 
God himself, religious indifference, etc., but the atheism in its most strict 
and literal meaning. One can easily imagine the 16th century mercenary 
soldier, who doesn’t care for his salvation and even challenges God and 
the Church, preferring the pleasures of the Earth and the plagues of Hell 
over the boredom of Heaven. In fact we do not need a lot of imagination, 
we know such condottieri by name. Still, it doesn’t make them atheists. 
According to Febvre, the thesis of actual atheism could not be articulated 
with the help of 16th century intellectual tools, for it lies out of the reach 
of this specific outillage mental. This discovery also sets limits for the 
historical interpretation of the work by Rabelais. Febvre could be right 
or wrong (historians’ opinions differ), but even if he is mistaken in this 
particular case, it does not render his theoretical ideas less important.
The concept of intellectual equipment, unlike the traditional concept 
of collective mentality, gives justice to the originality and creativity of 
individual acting, enables the understanding of intellectual innovation, 
for example the artistic and philosophical originality of Rabelais. One 
could even say that it simply enables an understanding of the greatness 
of such outstanding individuals, while at the same time preserving the 
importance of sociocultural factors. The theoretical consequences of 
this concept reach far and will yet require inquiry. It is, then, more than 
surprising, especially if we consider the position of Febvre as a “classic” 
author of modern historiography, quoted and referred to in every proper 
handbook, that so few scholars followed his ideas and developed their 
potential abilities. Specialized researching of outillage mental remained 
Febvre’s almost personal domain. Maybe the reason is that, compared 
to the traditional idea of the collective mentality, the concept of mental 
equipment narrowed the scope too drastically for some historians.
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Undoubtedly, the scope isn’t narrowed by the concept of the image 
of the world, alternatively defining the field of research of the history 
of culture or historical anthropology; “or,” because the most important 
author in this regard, Aaron Gurevich, used both these names almost 
interchangeably. 
The concept of the image of the world has been theoretically worked 
out by Gurevich in his methodological essays, in his polemics on the 
epistemological basics of historiography and in texts presenting the main 
concepts and achievements of the French “Annales” school (the school 
to which, so to say, Gurevich “critically belonged”).3 Still, much more 
important than direct theoretical and methodological remarks are the 
series of historical studies in which the Russian historian put his ideas 
to use, starting from the general shape of the Latin medieval image of 
the world, going through more specific problems of the individual in the 
medieval world4 and construction of the world image amongst the West-
ern medieval peasantry5 and finishing with detailed studies on medieval 
Scandinavia. If we will follow both his theoretical writings and historical 
studies, we can try to elucidate the concept of the image of the world in 
quite a systematic and complete way (as Gurevich never did). Of course 
we risk a kind of “overinterpretation,” but this risk is acceptable, I daresay, 
as long as its effects are useful and theoretically important.
The world is not something common and simply shared by peoples 
of different times and places. At any given time, it is socially constructed 
and this social construction sets the environment that frames the life of 
individuals, their behaviour, and their cognitive and expressive acts. Images 
of the world, connected with actual societies and historically changing, 
may not be easily translated one into another, and this is the job of the 
history of culture (or historical anthropology) to reconstruct no longer 
existing images of the world, that enable the understanding of events and 
signs coming from the distant past. 
One can of course ask, why Gurevich speaks consequently about dif-
ferent images of the world instead of speaking directly about differently 
constructed worlds or even just different worlds. The Russian anthropol-
3 A. Gurevich, Historical Anthropology of Middle Ages, University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago 1992.
4 A. Gurevich, The Origins of European Individualism, Wiley, New York 1995.
5 A. Gurevich, Medieval Popular Culture, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
1990.
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ogist and historian seems to suggest in such a way, that somewhere under 
the stratum of historically and culturally differentiated images of the world 
lies a separate world itself, independent from the ways of its imagining. 
It means in consequence that knowledge of this proper world, gained for 
example thanks to modern Western science, allows the rejection of some 
world-images as false and the acceptation of others – in a word, their valu-
ation in such a way that is hardly imaginable as an aim of anthropological 
research and that was never supported by Gurevich himself. Speaking 
about “images of the world” was, then, quite risky, but there seems to be 
strong reason for taking such a risk.
Let’s follow the event that was recalled by Gurevich in one of his books.6 
Here Vikings land for the first time on the shores of Lindisfarne and local 
monks go to the beach to greet unknown guests. We can guess how it was 
bound to finish. Sometime after the monks lie dead, and the Vikings are 
plundering the island and looting the monastery. The monks of Lindis-
farne interpreted the appearance of the Viking longships according to the 
rules of their own image of the world, within which the seafarers took 
the place of the guests. This interpretation was followed by the proper act 
of greeting, being a part of the required hospitality. They were answered, 
however, according to a different image of the world, in which they were 
not granted the place of a hospitable and welcoming host, but that of an 
obstacle between the warriors and their loot – an obstacle that should be 
removed and – being not of the warrior’s own society – is not protected 
by the suppression of killing (very strong within Scandinavian societies). 
Here two different images of the world met, and the “world itself ” should 
not be understood as an “objective reality” but as the space of this meeting. 
This “world” can be then described as the space of interaction between 
world-images. If we agree on such a reasoning – that comes from us, 
not Gurevich – the idea of a world differentiated from its images is even 
methodologically necessary to analyze the processes happening between 
societies of different world-images. It belongs to the scholar’s responsi-
bility that such an idea would not be transformed into a philosophical 
fundamentalism (or simple ethnocentrism).
Within Gurevich’s works the crucial stratum of the world-image seems 
to be a system of categories. The way in which Gurevich uses the term 
“category” can be only roughly referred to its philosophical tradition of 
previous uses, i.e. logical and transcendental, reaching back to Aristotle 
6 A. Gurevich, Pokhody Vikingov, Izd-vo Nauka, Moscow 1966.
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and Immanuel Kant. Taking a closer look at Gurevich’s study on the Latin 
medieval system of categories, allows to define this set as certain basic on-
tological determiners of world construction, grouped somewhat similarly 
to Kant’s proposition and containing such individual categories as time, 
space, labour, etc. On this level Gurevich project resembles Peter Frederick 
Strawson’s idea of “descriptive metaphysics.”7 This idea can be expressed as 
the belief that traditional questions of metaphysics are not “empty ques-
tions” (as they tend to be considered starting at least with Kant’s analysis 
of the aporia of pure reason or even with ancient scepticism and medieval 
nominalism), but are not also the fundamental questions, touching the 
general nature of being, as traditional metaphysics understands them, 
starting not later than with Parmenides. As fundamental questions they, of 
course, truly fall prey to all the dilemmas pointed out by Kant in Critique 
of Pure Reason. But, nevertheless, every possible human society assumes 
in its practices sets of metaphysical answers or decisions, not necessarily 
expressed, but sometimes “acted out,” considering the general nature of 
things existing. The “descriptive metaphysics” – to interpret Strawson’s 
idea in an anthropological way – is not researching the reality then, but 
it reconstructs social constructions of the world, the multiple metaphysics 
or conceptual schemes that underlie any socially accepted reality.
Gurevich’s point, that ontology of the world is socially and culturally 
constructed, historically changing and – last but not least – possible to 
be described as a set of categories, is already proved to be an effective 
assumption for historical explanation, even if we consider only Gurevich’s 
own studies. But if we look more carefully at the list of categories that 
were analyzed by him, we can notice that not all of them deal with the 
cultural ontology of the world. Some of them, like the category of labour, 
are connected with social organization, but on the most fundamental level, 
that we could name with György Lukács’s term as the “ontology of social 
being” (modifying strongly the notion, of course). Such a heterogenic 
system of categories covers then both the construction of “the natural” and 
“the social,” and a decision to mix ontological and social categories may 
yet find its justification in fact that the line dividing “social” and “natural” 
is itself a part of a particular (even if our own) image of the world and 
should not be imputed a priori to other images.
7 P. Strawson, Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, Taylor – Francis, Abing-
don 1959.
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By the way, if I speak in here about a crucial, categorial level of world- 
images as the ontological stratum of the world’s image, the reference is 
rather being made to traditional, pre-Heideggerian notion of ontology. 
From Heidegger’s point of view all the inquiry of world-image remains 
on an ontical plane and never reaches ontological thinking.
The second stratum that we can recognize in the whole that Gurevich 
researches as the “image of the world” is a system of statements on reality 
that a given group holds true or false. The statement like “There are many 
unicorns living south of Mediterranean, while in the north this animal is 
extremely rare” belongs to this second stratum. It lacks a categorial char-
acter and we can change its logical value without disturbing the system 
of categories. The second, descriptive stratum of the image of the world is 
then much more mobile, can change easier and is partially independent 
from the set of categories. Such independence can be only partial, because 
the status of many statements becomes clear in the light of the categories 
that form for them the interpretational or semiotic frame. 
Let’s illustrate this with an example taken from art history, representing 
a common and stubborn misunderstanding, present chiefly in popular 
handbooks rather than in professional art historians’ writings. The visual 
representations of creatures like chimaeras or unicorns, etc. in the arts 
of the Middle Ages are sometimes called “the Romanesque fantasy” and 
considered to be fictional or fantastical. This category is sometimes even 
extended to cover visual representations of mystical visitations of the Af-
terworld, images of infernal torments, etc. The misunderstanding lies in 
interpreting these visual representations according to the constructional 
rules of our own image of the world, instead of referring them to the 
image of the world that could be shared by a painter or a sculptor around 
the year 1000. From his point of view the world of representations isn’t 
divided into great realms of “realistic” and “fantastical” as we can divide 
it, and statements like “chimaeras exist” are held true. The visual rep-
resentation of the chimera is not a fantasy then, but an imaginary effort 
to represent the existing animal or monster. Such an effort is imaginary, 
because the artist lacks any direct visual experience that could teach him 
how a chimera looks. But he can learn it from the testimony of learned 
books, or the words of preachers and travellers. The authority of ancient 
authors renders such testimonies true. Of course the artist follows a cri-
terion of truth different from the criteria that we tend to accept, but the 
criteria of truth has – in Gurevich’s use of this word – the character of 
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a category and belong to the image of the world. By the way, it is the cat-
egorial character of the truth-criteria that strongly links categorial and 
descriptive strata of the world-image. And similarly, the specifics of truth 
and validation categories in the medieval image of the world exclude any 
doubts about the ecclesiastically confirmed relation from the Afterworld 
voyage. There was no such thing then as the “Romanesque fantasy” and 
it could be only created as the effect of the adaptation of Romanesque art 
to a different world-image. It’s striking, by the way, that representations 
like the Last Judgment are not interpreted in this way. The cause may be 
that common opinions on art history were shaped on the threshold of the 
19th and 20th century, when the socially shared image of the world – except 
for a narrow intellectual elite – still treated the eschatological element 
as belonging to reality. The interpreter living in the hypothetical society 
of atheists and carelessly imputing his own world image to the artworks 
of the past, would have to extend the idea of fantasy to the representations 
of the Resurrection, Transfiguration, etc. 
Even if we distinguish in Gurevich’s reconstructions of different 
world-images two different strata of categorial system and of descriptive 
statements on reality, we still have some more aspects to deal with. In 
his studies Gurevich deals with yet a third dimension of world-image, 
even if he never distinguished it theoretically. (Gurevich himself treated 
the concept of the world-image as a unified whole, only distinguishing 
the categories – the rest of the stratification is my proposition.) The third 
stratum of the world-image consists of evaluating judgments. They do not 
render what is true or false in reference to the world, as the statements 
of the second stratum did, but map the world with axiological references, 
creating at the same time the link between the systems of religion, law, 
ethics, etc. and everyday experience. In effect, images of the world are 
always axiologically evaluated and the world – seen not as a construct of 
a scientist, but as somebody’s past or present Lebenswelt – is never neutral. 
We can try a very simple but somewhat enlightening example of in-
terdependency between the three strata of world-image that we have dis-
tinguished so far. The stratum of categories (the category of real): the real 
is not limited to what can be sensually experienced and includes purely 
spiritual beings. The statement assuming a previous idea of reality: there 
is only one God. Valuation linking the system of statements with human 
acting: God is the source of values, determined by his commandments 
and forbiddances and then, killing, for example, is an evil act, strictly for-
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bidden by God’s will). A society, whose world image includes these three 
exemplary elements, will have to decide, amongst other things, what to 
do with its professional warriors. Here we leave the simplified example 
and touch the problems of real past societies. The decision will probably 
be made according to factors different from the internal logics of the 
world-image: according to the functional needs of society (which render 
the strict rejection of professional warfare probably impossible), conflicts 
and contests within the society, inconsistencies and contradictions within 
the world-image, intercultural processes, etc. The Latin West of the Middle 
Ages will hesitate between continuing the contradiction within its image 
of the world, accepting both the Ten Commandements and pre-Christian 
apology of the warrior at the same time (this internal conflict will become 
visible as a chasm between the ideals of the Latin community of docti and 
the Occitanic ideal of knighthood), and the strategy of reshaping the ideal 
of the warrior so that it could somehow fit in with the Christianity (thanks 
to enterprises like Bernard of Clairvaux’s militia Christi or more generally 
replacing the ideal of the knight with the Church ideal of the crusader). 
On the other hand, the Greek-speaking world of medieval Christianity, 
coming from different traditions and facing different challenges, will follow 
a different path: it will admit the impossibility of the true Christian war-
rior and in effect will prefer the use of professional, more often than not 
foreign mercenaries, holding them at the bottom of the social hierarchy 
(because they still must be held: the Slavs, Bulgarians, Arabs, Persians and 
others are not going anywhere).
If one accepts such an interpretation of Gurevich’s concept of the 
world-image, one can be immediately struck by its similarity to a theory 
widely known and strongly discussed in the past, i.e. to the concept of 
“total ideology,” proposed many decades ago by Karl Mannheim in his 
Ideology and Utopia.8 Mannheim distinguished two different dimensions 
of ideology. The first of them, which he calls the “particular ideology” 
denotes the same thing that Karl Marx’s use of the term “ideology” did: 
the system of cognitive and valuating judgments that is created and used 
by some social group (social class for Marx) as a tool of social struggle 
and domination. It is exactly the original meaning of the term “ideology,” 
that Napoleon Bonaparte used to describe the intellectual activities of his 
political opponents (naming them “ideologists”). It is also partially covered 
8 K. Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, Routledge, London 2002.
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by Antonio Gramsci’s concept of hegemony. Starting from Marx – or, 
nevermind the different words in use, even with the French philosophes 
of the Enlightenment – the critique of “particular ideology” became an 
emancipating effort of philosophy. It is continued not only by Marxists, 
but by every “hermeneutics of suspicion,” from Nietzsche to Foucault, no 
matter if the word “ideology” itself is used.
Unlike the term “particular ideology,” “total ideology” in Mannheim’s 
terms is not a functionally determined instrument of social struggle, but 
a  unified vision of the world. The name “ideology” can be justified as 
much as Mannheim deals primarily with its relation to social needs and 
interests, and only secondary with the representation of reality. 
This kind of “family resemblance” between Mannheim’s and Gurevich’s 
concepts – admitting the chronological primacy of Mannheim – should 
not cloud the differences. First, then, the theoretical purposes of both 
concepts are different. Gurevich’s concept of the world-image is supposed 
to enable the reconstruction of the past realities and creates the semiotic 
frame for the interpretation of the remains of those realities. The purpose 
of Mannheim’s concept is to demystify: it tries to explain how the play 
of interests and needs shapes every possible type of knowledge. These are 
then, respectively, those purposes situated in different fields of the history 
of culture (historical anthropology) and the sociology of knowledge. Fur-
thermore, one could not easily distinguish strata of analysis within Mann-
heim’s concept of “total ideology” and, ultimately, Mannheim follows the 
Marxist ideas of economical and social determinism, which are virtually 
absent in Gurevich’s theory. Both scholars seem to follow opposite direc-
tions: Gurevich asks how the meaning of human acts and their products 
can be established within the given world-image, while Mannheim asks 
how the “hard” economical and social factors form “soft” knowledge. These 
differences render Mannheim’s concept much less attractive for both the 
historian and the theoretician of culture than Gurevich’s one: with too 
much simplification and too many schematics in the picture of the relations 
between different aspects of social life. From the Marxist point of view, the 
main weak point of Mannheim’s concept was indicated by his colleague 
of the “Frankfurt School,” Max Horkheimer.9 According to Horkheimer 
the concept of “total ideology” annihilates the possibility of any critical 
9 M. Horkheimer, A New Concept of Ideology?, in N. Stehr, R. Grundmann (eds.), 
Knowledge: Critical Concepts, Routledge, London 2005.
30 Chapter 3
theory of society, to which Mannheim intended to contribute, because by 
interpreting every form of knowledge as ideology, Mannheim ceased any 
relation of knowledge to truth, making any critique of ideology only an-
other ideology, i.e. undermining all of Marx’s philosophical (and political) 
project. Even the word “ideology,” we can add, becomes useless, because 
it ceases to distinguish anything. As we yet shall see, this annihilation of 
the concept of truth is not implied by Gurevich’s ideas, even if it is quite 
easy to interpret them in the spirit of extreme relativism.
Against the first impressions, Febvre’s and Gurevich’s theoretical propo-
sitions may be conciliated. The main difference lies not in any disagreement 
on the most proper substitute for the misty concept of “mentality,” but in 
a way in which the relation of knowledge to acting is conceptualized: as 
a semiotic frame, which make human acts and their results meaningful 
(Gurevich) or using knowledge as a tool (Febvre). We’ll go come to this 
problem further, but even without much arguing we can say: why not both?
Still, even if we somehow conciliate the concepts of outillage mental 
and image of the world, we will not yet achieve a proper, theoretically clear 
equivalent to the concept of “mentality.” There’s more to it.
First and above all, all the emotional aspect of “collective mentality” 
still lies out of our reach. Then, our proposition still doesn’t cover the field 
actually researched by historians as “mentality.” One can try to solve this 
riddle by seeking help of so different authors as Martin Heidegger and 
Nelson Goodman. Second, what’s the relationship of non-instrumental 
components of world-images to human acting? What’s the link between 
what we think and feel and what we do, apart from using some parts 
of knowledge as tools? This is, of course, the traditional problem of the 
theory of culture.
The emotional aspect of human experiences enters the realm of the 
historian’s or cultural theoretician’s interest as something that was already 
expressed or communicated. If we don’t want to transmute the history 
of  culture into amateur psychology, we should postulate the limitation 
of inquiry to only those symptoms of emotional life that enter the inter-
subjective space of communication and symbolization. The psychology, 
that is an alternative to such limitation, would be bound to remain an 
amateur enterprise, because it would lack any basis in direct observation 
(not even mentioning the experimental basis) in respect to the past and 
it would have to assume some “collective subject” of the emotions, a kind 
of common mind that is able to feel, a concept not even similar to Durk-
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heim’s collective consciousness, probably impossible to defend. Limiting 
ourselves to expression and symbols of emotions, we can rightly say that 
they have a social style, specific for a given time and place, and while 
researching it we could even neglect the difference between primal and 
secondary emotions: they both can be symbolized. This would be a hasty 
decision though. We need to distinguish them to move a step further. 
If we consider some emotion, for example that of shame, to be of a sec-
ondary character, i.e. originating in sociocultural circumstances, it would 
be legitimate to write not only the history of its symbolization, but also 
a history of its construction or its origins. Such a history of shame, if 
aiming for completeness, would have to be not only the history of rep-
resentations, but also a history of socialization and the enculturation 
practices that induce this emotion in individuals. Such a history would 
be probably purposeless in the case of primal emotions: the explanation 
of their origins should be left to the biological theory of evolution or 
evolutionary psychology.
On the basis of such a history of the styles of the symbolization of emo-
tions (and of the social construction of secondary emotions), another 
classical question of the traditional history of mentality can be issued. In 
a given society the ways in which secondary emotions are constructed 
and all the emotions are symbolized seem to have some unifying qualities. 
For example in the Latin west of the 11th and early 12th centuries we can 
observe in the visual arts quite a unified way of expressing fear and rep-
resenting that which is terrifying. A coherent set of customs and artistic 
practices may be also recognized in the medieval, knightly representations 
of love. The classical study of knightly courtesy provided by Norbert Elias10 
showed that there was a specific social construction of shame, common for 
significantly large groups of people and radically different from contem-
porary constructs (not including, for example, the physiological excretion 
as shameful or even embarrassing or awkward). This allows to ask about 
the general emotional style of a given time and place, and renders the 
first intuition of the mentality historians fully valid. This is with but one 
correction: the history of emotional styles is not a psychology of people 
long dead, but the history of their symbolization and social practices. The 
emotional factor, in psychological meaning, remains highly hypothetical 
and everything we can actually research is mediated by the semiotic sys-
10 N. Elias, The Court Society, UCD Press, Dublin 2006.
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tems that organize the symbolization of emotions (or rather: what remains 
of this symbolization after centuries, sometimes doubly mediated, like 
the description of a custom). Isolating what originally was an emotional 
experience of the individual is impossible. On the other hand, there’s no 
reason to introduce any “collective subject” of the emotions in the place 
of an individual. The historical inquiry of emotional styles can still, even 
limited in such a way, distinguish many different forms of organized sym-
bolization and connect them with actual societies, up to a point where we 
can justly speak about communities that are of different “mood” (such as 
that of Weimar Republic).
Introducing the English term usually used as an equivalent to Heideg-
ger’s Stimmung11 is of course risky and the reasons why I’ve decided to take 
this risk must be made apparent. It is enough to emphasise that in Sein und 
Zeit mood is an ontological category, and it belongs to the construction 
of existence, i.e. to the way in which Dasein is. Any emotions that were 
expressed, intersubjectively communicated or symbolized, and that means 
every emotions that can become the point interest of history, belong, in 
Heidegger’s terms, to the ontical sphere (although they are ontologically 
grounded). The German philosopher would then never accept such a use of 
the term “mood.” Let it be clear: I’m using the term while suspending any 
reference to Heidegger’s ideas. With the term “mood” I want to denote the 
socially enforced disposition of individuals to symbolize and interpret their 
own emotional states according to obliging emotional styles (especially 
strong in the case of secondary emotions). This disposition can modify 
also the cognitive acts of individuals, and this aspect of the phenomenon 
is not covered by the term “emotional style.”
The emotional style can be included into the cultural image of the world 
as it’s next, fourth stratum and in this way a concept may be achieved that 
finally catches the intuitions connected with mentality as the object of 
historical research. We can speak now about differently “mooded” images 
of the world. But such a decision provokes further doubts and questions, 
with the first of them concerning the relationships between the first three 
strata of the world-image and the mood. At least two aspects of these 
relationships can be easily noticed.
The first of them is implied by the fact that the image of the world 
always includes evaluating judgements; and values of any kind cause 
11 M. Heidegger, Being and Time, Blackwell, Hoboken 1967.
 Explaining the mentality: mental equipment and image of the world 33
emotions, which is quite an obvious observation. If for any human com-
munity the world is evaluated, then, the world is automatically the object 
of emotional reactions. Now we can define mood a bit more closely: it also 
denotes the emotional relations of the community to the world, based upon 
the process of the valuation. The mood obviously has its psychological 
aspect, but we deal with it as long as it works as a frame, within which the 
human acts and their results are possible to understand. It would be hard 
to understand what happened, for example, in Clermont in 1095 without 
any reference to this emotional frame.
The second aspect of relationships between intellectual components of 
the world-image and mood is easily comprehended in the light of Nelson 
Goodman’s deliberation of the cognitive functions of emotions, presented 
in his Languages of Art.12 The American philosopher noticed something 
that, after he had noticed it, that is, seems so obvious and overlooked by 
many. According to Goodman our actual mood, i.e. our current emo-
tional states and dispositions, modify our everyday cognitive processes, 
and our cognition of Lebenswelt is partially determined by emotional 
processes (I would add: we can develop special techniques to minimize 
this impact, like in the natural and formal sciences). Considering in this 
light the importance of cognitive elements of the image of the world, its 
categories and statements, it is reasonable to include the aspect of mood 
directly into it. The mood modifies the character of the whole of the image, 
creating a kind of emotional filter through which truths and values are 
seen. Goodman’s examples come from the field of arts and we can follow 
him in this regard. Let’s consider some basic phenomena of romantic 
music. The melancholy of Symphony in b by Franz Schubert, popularly 
although improperly known as The Unfinished Symphony, may be, as an 
emotion, something that we, listeners, never experienced in our everyday 
life. Being an aesthetic value established within the artwork, it may be 
as well something that Schubert too never experienced (Schubert was, 
small thing to remember, a composer: he knew how to construct a proper 
expressivity of musical work). Listening to Symphony in b is, neverthe-
less, not limited to reactive “oh!” and “ah!” but also, in one of its aspects, 
a cognitive adventure: we are learning both some new kind of emotion 
and also how the world looks through the lens of this emotion. The art of 
12 N. Goodman, Languages of Art: An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Hackett Pub-
lishing, Indianapolis 1976.
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this kind allows us to experience the world in experimental moods and 
thanks to this, to understand alien images of the world. The art, even the 
art concentrated purely on emotion, is above all a form of cognition and 
understanding, and in this regard its offer may be, as in this case, deeper 
and much less problematic than the effects of scholarly study. 
I fully agree with Goodman both on the function of emotions within 
the arts and the cognitive character of emotions. Researching these phe-
nomena requires special carefulness though. An artwork, like Schubert’s 
symphony, or even a set of artworks, Schubert’s “b minor moods” as 
Richard Taruskin baptized them,13 do not necessarily bring any insight 
into the emotional style of Vienna in the early 19th century. Even if it did, 
why should Schubert’s “b minor moods” be any more representative than 
Beethoven’s “c minor moods” for instance? Artworks may be individual, 
experimental, compensative, archaic, prophetic, socially marginal and 
more often than not ambiguous. Still, neglecting them would mean the loss 
of sometimes the only chance to understand the emotional aspects of past 
life. The solution is to move away from the autonomous study of artworks 
to a study of their reception: what kind of emotions were interesting for 
the early 19th century Viennese composer and his audience? What kind 
of emotional images were fascinating? What was deemed to be a “deep” 
emotional life? Eventual fascination – in the second half of 19th and in the 
20th century an actual one – with musical works like Symphony in b is not 
a testimony to an explosion of collective melancholy. But it does testify 
to social interest in melancholy, and shows that melancholy, subjectively 
experienced or not, belonged to the socially required emotional style of 
a time and place; at least this is true for some part of the people.
Accepting the thesis on cognitive frames formed by emotions, on the 
“cognitive moods,” there is no longer any reason to not include mood as 
a rightful stratum of the image of the world. Such an image can be, then, 
described now as consisting of four strata: the categorial system, the system 
of descriptive statements about the world, the set of evaluating judgements 
and the emotional style.
Some previous remarks on the problems of researching the emotional 
styles have already shown the crucial importance of semiotic processes 
in communicating and shaping images of the world. Every world image 
13 R. Taruskin, The Oxford History of Western Music, vol. 3, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford – New York 2010.
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is dependent on the characteristics of many semiotic systems, thanks to 
which it can gain intersubjective accessibility and then social validity. 
There’s not much risk, in hypothesis, that every image of the world has 
some semiotic specifics that cannot be separated from it. If this is the 
case, these semiotic characteristics of the world-image must be necessarily 
included to the image of the world itself as its fifth stratum.
The concept of such a stratified world-image, achieved in this way, is 
already something quite different from Gurevich’s concept, although the 
differences lie more in explicit theoretical decisions than in the actual 
practice of research. Even if not distinguished and named by Gurevich, 
all the strata that we have previously described are objects of Gurevich’s 
own studies. Many essays brought about the detailed study of categorial 
system. Medieval Popular Culture is in large part dedicated to a study of 
what we call here the stratum of descriptive statements. The problems 
of values and world-valuation can be found in almost every study that 
Gurevich ever wrote. Also the studies concentrated on the fourth and fifth 
strata of the world-image can be pointed out. There is a fascinating study 
in Historical Anthropology of Middle Ages on what we call the emotional 
style, dealing with medieval Scandinavia: On Heroes, Things, Gods and 
Laughter in Germanic Poetry. There’s also last but not least, an extended 
study on the relationship between the world-image and its main semiotic 
system (that is language, of course) based upon the analysis of the old 
Nordic terminology of land ownership. We have in this chapter remained 
true, I hope, to Gurevich’s historical anthropology.

Chapter 4
From mentality to culture:  
knowledge and act
It seems that thanks to Febvre and above all Gurevich we managed to 
achieve a somewhat ordered equivalent to what historians of culture ha-
bitually call the “mentality.” There’s a paradox within this analysis though: 
every detail has led further and further away from the first psychological 
and ethnological intuitions. The final step, the five-strata structure of the 
image of the world, doesn’t resemble much Lévy-Bruhl’s concept of men-
tality and probably no psychologist would agree to name it with this term. 
What we came to is, in fact, a socially organized and structured system 
of knowledge that is shared, to greater or lesser extent, by the members of 
some group. Even the emotional style we included as part of the world-im-
age’s cognitive frame and style of emotion-symbolizing. This system falls 
completely under the definition of cultural knowledge or, in other words, 
under the cognitive definition of culture. In its most popular and classical 
version, proposed by Ward Goodenough,1 it even includes socially shared 
emotions or at least socially induced emotional dispositions. It’s probably 
high time to finally replace the term “mentality” with the more accurate 
term “culture.” The analysis provided here suggests that the so called 
“history of mentality” always was de facto the history of culture anyway. 
Let’s be just, though: there are some reasons for which many historians 
may still prefer the term “mentality.” The name “history of culture” quite 
usually denoted and often still denotes a special species of historical output: 
1 W. Goodenough, Culture, Language and Society, Addison-Wesley Modular Publi-
cations, Reading 1971.
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the recital of products of symbolic and material activity, the catalogue of 
names, the list of baroque buildings and writings in 17th century Rome, 
the list of Gothic churches in Silesia, etc. This kind of historical output, 
this kind of “history of culture,” criticized and often ridiculed, is still far 
from being abandoned. And it represents just “battle-history” in a differ-
ent field – exactly what the French historians of the “Annales” tradition 
intentionally and so fiercely opposed. One can easily understand such 
a sentiment toward even a tantalizingly unclear concept, like mentality, 
that became also a banner directed against such a “history of culture.” 
And such a history was even further form the “Annales” postulates than 
any political history, especially political history of a high self-awareness 
like the school founded on Leopold Ranke’s tradition. Today, we probably 
shouldn’t name such “catalogue-history” a history of culture any longer. 
A name like “history of artistic and scientific output” would be more proper 
(or even more correctly: a chronicle of the artistic and scientific output). 
It’s now perhaps a good moment to go back to a problem previously 
mentioned as the second most important dilemma connected with the con-
cept of mentality: the relationship between mentality and human acting. 
After replacing the idea of mentality with a proper concept of culture, we 
can now express this problem differently: what is the relationship between 
cultural knowledge and human acting? What is the relationship between 
culture and social practice? And this is, of course, the classic problem 
of cultural anthropology, philosophy of culture and sociology. The answer 
proposed long ago in the form of the typology of acting by Max Weber,2 
proved to be influential up to today and probably the most canonical 
one. It served well during the critique of the nomothetic model of history 
within the analytical philosophy of history provided by William Herbert 
Dray.3 It served well also in construction of hermeneutical philosophy 
of history proposed by Paul Ricoeur.4 In Poland it formed the basis for 
one of the most influential theories of culture, i.e. the social-regulatory 
theory of culture formulated by Jerzy Kmita.5
Let’s start with Kmita’s proposition. The Polish philosopher assumed the 
generalized in comparison to Weber theoretical model of rational acting, 
2 M. Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, University of 
California Press, Oakland 1978.
3 W. H. Dray, Laws and Explanation in History, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1957.
4 P. Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, Chicago University Press, Chicago 1984–1988.
5 J. Kmita, Kultura i poznanie, PWN, Warsaw 1985.
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covering Weber’s categories of purpose-rational acts and value-rational 
acts, allowing also the interpretation of traditional acting. It doesn’t cover 
the category of affective acting though.
According to Kmita’s conception, the subjective-rational acting can 
be described as being regulated by a determinant which includes two 
elements: the norm and the directive. The norm points to the purpose of 
the act, in other words it prescribes a value realized by acting. The direc-
tive, subdued to the norm, indicates the way to achieve the normatively 
prescribed value. Both the norm and the directive are accessible as long 
as they are articulated in the medium of language, and therefore they are 
always given as normative and directival judgements and can be described 
semantically as the denotations of respective utterances. From the point 
of view of the acting subject, we can speak about normative and directival 
beliefs. If we consider the whole of the normative and directival beliefs of 
a given subject, we can describe them as hierarchically ordered. 
Such a conception of human acting can be only accepted if one previ-
ously accepts the so called “assumption of rationality.” This requires some 
slight elucidation, because Kmita’s conception tends to be misinterpreted 
at this point. Neither the substantial idea of reason, nor the similar idea 
of rationality is assumed here. Rationality is assumed only in the meaning 
proposed by decision theory, although “loosened” in comparison to its uses 
in mathematics, economics, cybernetics or engineering. In a simplified 
form, this concept of rationality can be elucidated in the following way: 
every acting subject disposes a set of possible purposes, although they are 
preferred to different degrees. The hierarchy of possible purposes forms the 
order of preference, which can be expressed by assigning to every possible 
purpose a numerical value from 0 to 1 (where “0” denotes the unwanted 
purpose, while “1” denotes a maximal preference). The acting subject 
has also a certain knowledge about the circumstances of his or her acts 
and about the probability of achieving different possible purposes. This 
subjectively comprehended probability of achieving a certain purpose in 
the circumstances given can be also expressed by a numerical value from 
0 to 1, just like in mathematical probability theory. The highest product of 
multiplying the value of preference and the value of esteemed probability, 
contained of course between 0 and 1, indicates the action that will be taken. 
Such a concept may be, of course, useful when dealing with purely theo-
retical game situation or trying to predict the mass-behaviour of groups. 
When trying to explain an action taken by an individual, however, this 
concept of rationality requires modification. 
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The most general assumption stands: that individuals, while acting, 
remain true to their beliefs (axiological hierarchy) and to their knowledge 
about the means and circumstances of their acting. All the mathematical 
apparatus must be abandoned however. First, this is because the individ-
ual’s hierarchy of purposes may be the object of continuous changes and 
remains notoriously unclear. Assigning to these purposes strict numer-
ical values does not then make much sense. At the same time though, 
the quality of the decision-rationality concept that many value most, it’s 
ability to fund a valid prediction, is practically lost. After the rejection 
of the quantitative model, the concept may only help in explaining acts 
already actually taken. But cultural theory may well limit itself to such 
explanations, giving up the ambition to predict. Second, the most valuable 
element of decision-rationality theory to be preserved is the reference not 
to an “objective” hierarchy of purposes or to “objectively true” knowledge 
about the circumstances of acting, but to subjective beliefs of the person 
acting. This is why Kmita used the term “subjective-rational determinacy” 
and not “rational determinacy.” 
Assumption of rationality, reduced to the assumption of the con-
sequence of subjective knowledge and acting, is not a psychological 
statement and states nothing, or rather is not obliged to state anything, 
about the psychological process of deciding. It is only a methodological 
assumption that renders human acts possible objects of interpretation. 
In other words, without the assumption of rationality no connection 
can be established between human acting and human beliefs or, on the 
scale of society, between cultural knowledge and social practice. It would 
probably not be an exaggeration to say that without the assumption of ra-
tionality, neither the history of culture nor its theory are possible, or at 
least they lack acceptable criteria and can become the realm of phantas-
magoria. Of course, it’s true that real people seem sometimes to behave 
in a contradictory manner to even such a narrowly defined rationality. 
Usually though it means that either we lack a proper knowledge about 
people’s beliefs and axiology, or that we are dealing with such an act that 
is determined by factors other than cultural and which therefore cannot 
be explained by cultural theory. We may point here to physiologically 
determined reflexes (rationality and beliefs have nothing to do with how 
our eyes react to light, and extending cultural explanation to behaviour out 
of conscious control would have ridiculous consequences, like assuming 
that falling stone realizes such a value like “falling down” according to its 
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knowledge about gravity as a mean of acting...), actions taken under ex-
treme emotional tension, actions determined by mental illness and a few 
other phenomena. There’s no need to claim the explanatory omnipotence 
of cultural theory; it’s more important to remain within the realm of phe-
nomena for which cultural explanations are valid.
Anyway, Kmita’s concept of subjective-rational acts and the respective 
mode of explanation, called the subjective-rational explanation or hu-
manistic interpretation (I will consequently use the first term to not pro-
voke misunderstandings: the term “interpretation” remains traditionally 
connected not with explanation but with what German philosophy calls 
“understanding”), agrees well with both Max Weber’s sociological tradition 
and many concepts proposed by historians and philosophers of history: 
from Johann Gustav Bernhard Droysen’s idea of “moral forces”6 and the 
forms of historical explanation considered in analytical philosophy after 
Carl Gustav Hempel, up to Ricoeur’s hermeneutic philosophy of history.
Subjective-rational explanation deals with the acting of the individual, 
and to formulate a concept that would connect the cultural image of the 
world with social practice, we need to move to the social plane. This step 
has been made by Kmita. The social practice is the name that the Polish 
philosopher uses to describe the whole complex of subjective-rational acts 
taken by members of a given society. Social practice can be divided into 
different types, gathering similar acts, according to the social division of 
labour (at least in most of known societies). Every type of social practice 
(for example artistic or political practice) can be characterized by a set 
of recurring norms and directives, regulating repeatable acts. These can 
be reconstructed as socially shared normative-directival complexes. Such 
a complex is, of course, the effect of scholarly reconstruction, not the sep-
arate “ontological level” of reality. Kmita named such complexes with the 
term “forms of social consciousness,” borrowed from Marx in a slightly 
modified meaning. We have then a “social form of consciousness – type of 
social practice” system. The set of social forms of consciousness, connected 
with different types of social practice, is what Kmita called “culture.” We 
can then replace the description of the system with a broader one: “cul-
ture – social practice.” “Culture” defined in this way consists of socially 
shared but subjectively held beliefs and can be described as “mental reality” 
as long as we remember that it is reconstructed thanks to ideation and we 
do not interpret it psychologically.
6 J. G. B. Droysen, Outlines in the Principles of History, Ginn – Company, Boston 1897.
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What exactly is the status of such beliefs and their connection with 
acting? The modes of this are described by distinction between “accepting” 
and “respecting” the beliefs. The acceptance of cultural beliefs is without 
any doubt a mental act, that – curiously – does not always need to ac-
company the acts taken in agreement with these beliefs. Take language: 
we do not mentally accept the rules of grammar, we simply follow them. 
Beliefs, granted to us in the process of enculturation, can be treated as 
being of “a second nature” and we do not even need to be fully aware of 
them to respect them. Respecting the cultural norms is then something 
not mental but behavioural: we follow them regardless of our acceptation 
and awareness. Four types of connection between culture and acting can be 
then deduced from Kmita’s theory: respecting the norms with acceptance, 
respecting without acceptance, acceptance without respecting (for example 
non-practicing Christians) and, of course, the lack of both acceptance and 
respecting, i.e. the rejection of one’s society’s culture. Kmita’s theory, mis-
understood sometimes for some kind of strict cultural determinism (not 
without Kmita’s own responsibility, thanks to the frequent use of the word 
“determination”) includes then, although implicitly, types of behaviour 
ranging from extreme cultural conformism up to a rebellion. To general-
ly describe the relation of culture to social practice Kmita preferred the 
term “regulation,” hence the name “social-regulatory theory of culture.” 
But the situation of rebellion seems to escape “regulation,” even if it’s still 
dependent on the cultural context. Here we touch the first of at least two 
important points, where Kmita’s theory and my previous theses do not 
agree. It’s worthwhile to take a closer look at this disagreement. 
The situation of rebellion, but also of accepting beliefs without respect-
ing them, seems to point to a different relation than the regulatory one 
between cultural knowledge and social practice. It may also mean that the 
idea of “regulation” is a bit too narrow. We already know how to extend 
it: the answer is in Febvre’s theory of outillage mental. 
Both Kmita’s and Febvre’s theoretical propositions, taken separately, 
describe only a part of the possible connections between knowledge and 
acting. Cultural beliefs can, of course, take regulative functions and even 
the most creative and non-conformist individual respects lots of social 
norms unawares: so much is obvious. We can safely assume that even 
a person so impressively free from group intellectual habits like, say, 
Friedrich Nietzsche, rented his hotel rooms as was customarily done. 
Why should he do it otherwise? Just the same, he respected – and with 
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what an effect! – the rules of German language, which guaranteed his 
communicational effectiveness. On the other hand, even seemingly the 
most conformist and non-creative individual regularly uses the cultural 
norms and directives as tools: if a humble clerk, in everyday life perfectly 
embodying the “Keiser und König cultural conformism,” suddenly refuses 
to shake hands with his superior, or even to properly greet him (because 
he, for example, feels mistreated too much), he no longer respects the rules 
of custom and instead uses them to manifest something through cultural 
disobedience (like preserving his own personal dignity). “Regulating” and 
“serving as tools” seem, then, to describe two crucial modes of the social 
functioning of cultural knowledge, modes that are coexisting and that are 
not mutually exclusive. We move between them spontaneously and without 
effort and they can define our behaviour in different circumstances and 
different fields of life.
Even the typology of cultures is imaginable according to their preference 
of one of these modes above another. It’s enough though to differentiate 
two distinct model states of cultural knowledge. I’d call them figuratively 
“sleeping” and “awoken” culture. “Sleeping culture” is characterized by 
a strong dominance of the regulative mode over using cultural knowledge 
as a tool. So called “traditional cultures” probably belong here, including 
many non-European cultures and traditional peasant-cultures. The change 
in such cultures may be the effect of the imperfect transmission of cultural 
knowledge or unintentional innovations more than the effect of intentional 
acts. The “waking of the culture,” i.e. its moving towards the dominance 
of using the cultural knowledge as a set of tools for creative acting, usually 
manifests itself in radical changes and takes place under circumstances 
that can be recognized and researched. I think such a wakening is what 
Arnold Toynbee tried to research as part of the “birth of the civilization.” 
There are some “permanently awoken” cultures, like in the Western world 
starting with the industrial revolution or even with the Italian Renaissance 
or the Reformation. There are also spectacular cases of a sudden “waking 
up” of traditional cultures, that obviously demand close study from this 
point of view. Such a case is the Ghost Dance movement of the 19th cen-
tury Native Americans, inspired by the Paiute prophet Wovoka.7 It’s a very 
rare example of the activity of a founder of religion in a well documented 
chronological period, of an “American Muhammad,” although one lacking 
sufficient economic and military support.
7 M. Hittman, Wovoka and the Ghost Dance, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln 1990.
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If assuming the interdependence between the regulatory and tool 
modes of the functioning of cultural knowledge removes the first disa-
greement between Kmita’s theory and my previous propositions, there 
are still other disagreements remaining, above all the terminological and 
theoretical conflict between the concept of culture proposed as an effect 
of the analysis of Gurevich’s ideas and the definition of culture in Kmita’s 
theory. 
Let’s recall: the culture, as a theoretic equivalent to the unclear concept 
of “mentality,” has been defined as a stratified image of the world, shared 
by the members of some community. Kmita, on the other hand, defines 
culture as the normative and directival knowledge connected directly 
with acting. If we want to preserve both the effects of the previous anal-
ysis of historians’ concept of mentality and the link between knowledge 
and acting proposed in Kmita’s theory, this disagreement must be solved. 
Luckily, it is based more on the different terminological choices than on 
deep, theoretical conflict.
The whole sphere that is here described, after Gurevich, as a cultural 
image of the world is also considered by Kmita, but as a part of the whole 
broader than culture, i.e. as a part of social consciousness. Why Kmita nar-
rowed the meaning of the word “culture” so much is easy to comprehend. 
At least two goals are simultaneously achieved thanks to such a semantic 
narrowing. First, culture is strictly connected with human behaviour, and 
its concept excludes everything that cannot be observed in social practice. 
In this way the traditional contradiction between the concept of cultural 
knowledge and older concepts of culture as behavioural patterns has been 
overcome. This solution should not be underestimated, because it allows to 
integrate both different theories and different empirical researches. Second, 
in this way an empirical criterion is established for any reconstruction of 
cultural knowledge: its validity can be estimated thanks to the reference 
to social practices. Kmita’s decision was, then, well founded.
At the same time, though, this well founded decision somewhat con-
tradicts basic intuitions that are connected with the term “culture,” shared 
by most of scholars and expressed in a straightforward way by Yuri Lot-
man: “Let’s emphasize, that the concept ‘culture,’ belonging to the most 
fundamental in the cycle of sciences about humans, could become and not 
once became the subject-matter of a separate book. It would be strange, if 
we had aimed in here for the solution of contested problems, connected 
with this concept. It’s very capacious: it contains morality, a whole world 
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of ideas, human creativity and many other things.”8 Of course, I’m also 
not trying to solve all the dilemmas around the concept of “culture,” but 
still I hope to propose a formulation useful for cultural-historical research 
and following these basic intuitions. Preserving these intuitions forces us 
to take diverge from Kmita’s terminological decision, even if I consider it 
to be well founded. One of the reasons for this is simple but still relevant: 
narrowing the definition of culture in Kmita’s way, against commonly 
shared intuitions, would provoke (and really has provoked and provokes) 
constant terminological misunderstandings. But there is also a theoretical 
reason: I believe, that every serious research on the normative and directi-
val knowledge forces a broader perspective and includes research on what 
Kmita calls the broader “social consciousness.” Let’s consider an example.
In some contemporary societies, for example in Poland, quite a com-
mon practice can be observed: many people follow the Roman Catholic 
observances, socially considered to be of great importance, like baptiz-
ing their children or marrying in the church. Not all of them are actual 
Catholic believers, and not so few are cultural conformists. The difference 
between baptizing a child by a believer and a nonbeliever can be yet ex-
pressed as different sets of norms and directives. The same directive “to 
achieve a goal x, and baptize your child according to Roman Catholic 
practice,” can serve different norms: “you should assure the place of your 
child within the community of the redeemed by washing off the original 
sin” for a hypothetical believer, and “you should assure the safe, not dis-
criminated place in society for your child” for a hypothetical nonbeliever 
(and some acts may try to achieve both these goals). But the meaning 
of baptism or the set of meanings associated with baptism, the semantics 
of this act in a word, remain different for the believer and the non believer. 
This difference is not founded in the goals of their acts but in their different 
world-images. Reconstruction of the meaning of a symbol, and baptism is 
a symbol, demands an inevitable recursion to the sphere placed by Kmita 
beyond culture in the strict sense. This argument could be strengthened 
by almost every study in the history of culture, that always deals, under 
one name or another, with world-images. Why limit then the meaning of 
“culture” if actual research must cross this limitation anyway?
These two reasons, above, are, in my opinion, strong enough to jus-
tify following the broad meaning of the word “culture.” Still this broad 
8 J. Łotman, Rosja i znaki. Kultura szlachecka w wieku XVIII i na początku XIX, słowo/
obraz terytoria, Gdansk 2010, p. 5. 
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meaning can be defined precisely. Culture then will be understood in here 
as a conjunction of two great spheres of socially shared knowledge: the 
stratified cultural image of the world and the set of norms and directives, 
that connect culture with social practice. The empirical criterion has been 
sadly weakened in this way, and drastically weakened, but it can be less 
a problem for the history of culture than it seems: past behaviour and its 
direct results cannot be observed anyway, and are reconstructed by means 
more hermeneutical than empirical.
To save such a concept of culture from eclecticism, the next question 
must be necessarily issued, now concerning not the relationship between 
culture and social practice, but between the main spheres of culture, i.e. 
the image of the world and the norms-directives complex. Apart from 
describing these relations as multiple, two different forms of them can 
be distinguished. 
There are some situations when cultural norms must be explicitly 
formulated and defended, for example when their validity is challenged 
by a part of society. Such an explicit legitimization of cultural norms, es-
pecially when not provided by professionals like theologians, philosophers 
or political ideologists but used in everyday discourse, tend sometimes 
to become multileveled: you should not fornicate, because it is forbidden 
by the Sixth Commandment, and the Ten Commandments are a direct 
expression of God’s will, and one should be obedient to His will, for it is 
the only source of knowledge of good and evil; and you should do good 
not only for the fear of punishment, but also out of love to God, etc. 
Let’s notice that every single statement of such a discourse makes sense 
only within a certain image of the world, which includes the existence of 
a transcendent and moral God, which evaluates human acts according to 
their moral effects; let’s notice then that cultural norms are legitimized by 
statements belonging to a certain world-image. The first type of relation 
between the image of the world and normative-directival knowledge is 
the legitimization of norms by statements belonging to the world-image. 
Let’s call such statements, when considered in this particular function, the 
norm legitimizing judgements. Of course, not always do cultural norms 
require explicit legitimization, not when they are simply followed – it can 
be probably connected with the degree of “awakefullness” of the given 
culture. Even rarer, but gender relations in contemporary Europe are 
striking example of this rarity, are situations, when cultural norms become 
an object of public debate and deliberation. They seem characteristic for 
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societies shaken by industrial revolution, but even within such societies 
primacy seems to still belong to the mechanics of conformism, discoursive 
power, social exclusion, etc., in a few words, to all the processes described 
by Gramsci9 as domination and hegemony (and that, he believed, may be 
overcome). This primacy, unsympathetic as it is, against all appearances, 
is valid also for “highly developed societies,” if one is colonially minded 
enough, to accept such a term. But even in most traditional groups we 
usually find a set of myths or otherwise formulated religious beliefs that 
provide a strong and legitimizing link between world-image and cultural 
norms. The same function can be fulfilled by a metaphysical system or po-
litical ideologies. The practical significance of these forms of knowledge for 
the processes of enculturation may differ, although 20th century totalitarian 
societies provide examples of extremely high importance. If image of the 
world is connected with set of norms and directives as its legitimization, 
it’s also indirectly connected with social practice and human acting.
Let’s consider a second way in which the world-image and norma-
tive-directival knowledge are connected, one already analyzed in detail by 
Kmita, although in different terminology. If we go back to our simplified 
example of multileveled dependencies between norms and legitimizing 
judgements, we can emphasize now that actual behaviour based upon the 
forbiddance of fornication depends to a lesser extent on any legitimization 
than on a semantic decision. Both the history of language and the history 
of religions teach us that the meaning of the word “fornication” is flexible, 
historically changing – this means that the exact meaning of forbiddance 
itself is the object of change and relative to the semantic context. Even 
within different forms of Judaism and Christianity it may denote only 
adulteration in the narrowest meaning or every sexual act not aimed 
at proliferation, including ones within heterosexual marriages. Actual 
human behaviour may, then, be rooted in the history of semantics, and 
the meaning of norms is always comprehended within the frame of the 
world-image, including its valuations. A bit closer look at Kmita’s semantic 
conception should make it clear.10
Kmita claims that units of language (words, sentences) do not only de-
note objects of reference. The latter are determined not by any metaphysical 
relation between the language and the world, but by the social practice 
of using language, similarly to the later ideas of Wittgenstein. The object 
 9 A. Gramsci, Prison Notebooks, Columbia University Press, New York 2011.
10 J. Kmita, Kultura...
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of reference of a given unit can be then defined as the social acceptability 
of using this unit to denote a given object for the competent linguistic 
community (usually a community of native speakers). Denotation is not 
all the meaning, though, because mapping the language by the practice of 
using it never happens in a neutral world, but in the world that is already 
characterized and evaluated. In the terminology proposed here, we can say 
that language is not mapped onto “the world” but onto the cultural image 
of the world. Kmita conceptualized this situation by introducing the con-
cept of semantic presumptions. Semantic presumptions are judgements, 
descriptive or valuating, that do not indicate the denoted object of a given 
semantic unit, but provide knowledge and valuations that are implicitly 
assumed in the act of communication. For example the Polish words “za-
bójca” and “morderca” both denote a person who has killed someone, but 
the presumed valuations are different. Every killer can be called “zabójca” 
(it’s relatively neutral term), but we reserve the word “morderca” for crimes 
and especially offensive acts. We wouldn’t name anybody who killed in 
self-defence or a soldier who killed an enemy soldier in a clear combat 
situation with the word “morderca.” If one calls a soldier “morderca,” one 
usually challenges the social order legalizing war killing, or suggests that 
some war crimes have been committed. Personally, I can’t recall any use 
of this word to denote the act of self-defence. In European languages we 
meet similar semantic oppositions quite often, like the English “killer” – 
“murderer” or the German “Attentäter” – “Mörder.” Such a distinction is 
fully comprehensible only if we consider all the history of the European 
images of killing, starting with the ethics of the knighthood and the idea 
of honour. It demands the study of the Western cultural image of the world 
then. Using one of these words – and its only an example of a common 
situation – we start a full chain of semantic presumptions, both descriptive 
and valuating, belonging to our image of the world (including, more often 
than not, some of its past versions that could seem no longer functioning). 
The second connection between the cultural image of the world and nor-
mative-directival knowledge is established by the semantic presumptions, 
thanks to which norms can establish values. There’s no need to additionally 
emphasize the fact that valuating presumptions are crucial for explaining 
subjective-rational acts.
Let’s consider now the theses that were proposed here up to this point, 
and some more theses that are rather non-controversially accepted in the 
contemporary humanities: that the basic link between the main spheres 
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of culture (the image of the world and normative-directival knowledge) 
is of a semantic character; that both these spheres are accessible only if 
they were expressed as sets of signs, above all as utterances in language; 
that every process of enculturation or socialization is communicationally 
mediated by the use of signs; that every subjective-rational act, either 
culturally regulated or manipulating cultural knowledge in the form of 
a  tool, requires understanding of the signs, i.e. requires interpretation; 
that no semiotic system is fully transparent, i.e. the qualities of semiotic 
systems modify what is communicated (up to the famous saying of Mar-
shall McLuhan’s: “the medium is the message”).
These theses can be, I think, accepted now without additional delib-
eration and such an acceptance places the theory and history of com-
munication and symbols in the centre of the study of culture. In short, it 
places semiotics in a somewhat privileged place. Yuri Lotman expressed 
such a belief very strongly: “According to what we said, culture is some-
thing common for a given community – a group of people living at the 
same time and connected by a certain social organization. It implies that 
culture is a form of communication between people and it’s possible only 
in a group in which people communicate amongst themselves. [...] Every 
structure serving the sphere of human communication is a language. It 
means that it creates a certain system of signs, used according to the rules 
that are familiar to members of given society.”11 I don’t think that Lotman 
intended to limit the theory of culture to semiotics. Such a limitation is 
not desirable for a few reasons, above all for the necessity of connecting 
cultural knowledge and human acting with their environment (both so-
cial and geographical). This will yet become an important problem here. 
The rejection of semiotic reduction, though, does not remove semiotic 
problems from the centre of the theory of culture. Most of them could 
be interpreted, by the way, as hermeneutic, not only semiotic problems.
All the elucidation of the concept of culture proposed here is, of course, 
not lacking its own problems. At least one of the possible theoretical accu-
sations, of the most general nature, should be considered before moving 
any further.
Replacing the concept of “mentality” with the concept of culture doesn’t 
automatically solve problems; furthermore there is a danger of repeating 
the same errors under a different name. The concept of culture seems to 
11 J. Łotman, Rosja i znaki..., p. 5.
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still assume the existence of a relatively unified collective consciousness 
of unclear status, so it seems to repeat both ontological dilemmas and the 
unifying effects of the concept of mentality. Additionally, the concept of 
cultural knowledge seems to cut the world of shared ideas off from the 
economic and geographical context just as the concept of mentality did. 
Finally, the concept of culture has been so far considered only structurally 
and synchronically: where’s the time and the change? Did we not lose 
history meanwhile? The second and third doubts will be further studied 
in detail, but the first requires some kind of immediate answer.
Cultural knowledge don’t have to be treated as a separate dimension 
of reality and its concept is not doomed to provoke ontological dilem-
mas. It’s enough to assume that we are always dealing with the beliefs of 
individuals, and only individuals, and that such beliefs can be shared at 
least to some reasonable extent by other individuals. Cultural knowledge 
is then nothing more but a scholar’s construct, serving for explanation 
and understanding of those human phenomena that are involving many 
individuals in a similar way, like speaking the same language. Is such 
a  construct necessary, if ultimately it can be decomposed into sets of 
individual beliefs? What can we achieve thanks to it that could not be 
achieved from the individualistic perspective?
Individual beliefs are not accessible unless they were expressed or 
communicated, i.e. articulated according to the rules of some semiotic 
system, usually language. Semiotic, systems, though cannot be reduced 
to individual phenomena: no system of this kind can be fully controlled 
by any individual, and its full individualization would cease its commu-
nication effectiveness (via the paradox of private language). None of such 
systems is also fully transparent or neutral. The belief generally, even if we 
do not intend to communicate it to any other person, as long as we speak 
about beliefs, not emotions, is always semiotically shaped. Our own beliefs 
are given to us in a form mediated by language, that is, not purely ours.
This can be expressed even more strongly: thanks to the interdependen-
cy of language and thinking, no user of language presents himself or herself 
in an unmediated way: even for ourselves we are objects of interpretation 
and we do not have “direct access” to ourselves (if anything, this is what can 
make each human quite a unique being and defines the difference between 
an animal and a human). What we call our singularity or innermost expe-
rience includes the presence of elements social and cultural. Singularity is 
founded not in self-reflection, but in the uniqueness of our body and its 
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particular experiences: pain, pleasure, etc.; at least this is so as long as we 
do not start to think what our pain can indicate and read it as a symptom of 
illness only. So, against Schopenhauer’s claims we are not given to ourselves 
as “Ding an sich” but as a chain of changing interpretations, formulated 
in accordance with the rules of semiotic systems, that are never truly our 
individual products, even if we use them in an extremely individual way, 
on the border of idiosyncrasy. This state of human affairs was described 
by traditional structural and early poststructural theories, treating the 
individual as only the result, the “crossing point” of different structures 
and grammars, starting with language. Michel Foucault expressed it in 
his famous thesis on “the death of man,” removing human beings, these 
“results” only, from the field of view of the humanities and replacing 
them with autonomous relations between different structures. We do not 
need to follow Foucault’s extremism here after we have allowed to treat 
cultural knowledge, the semiotic system and social practices (“discourses” 
in Foucault’s terminology) as not only regulating factors, but also as tools 
to be creatively used. This even renews the problem of what it means to 
be human and of human singularity. It’s tempting to call it “the rebirth of 
human” to directly challenge Foucault: we are going not towards a vision 
of grammars and structures determining and “producing” the human, but 
towards a human using those grammars and practices to produce himself 
and his world. There is no need to challenge Foucault here, though, as the 
French philosopher noticed the very same problem and followed a similar 
path in his so called “late writings.” If Discipline and Punish12 brought 
the study of “subject production” by social and discoursive techniques of 
power, the second and third volume of The History of Sexuality13 brought 
an altered vision of the subject, manipulating elements of discourses as 
tools and “producing himself ” (the subject) with the use of what I call 
culture. This study was based on hellenistic techniques of sexual ethics 
and medicine. To a very large extent I share this vision of the relationship 
between the individual and culture.
If we are dealing, then, not with the matter of the ontological status 
of culture, but with the usefulness of such a concept in the explanation 
of human acts and their results, we are of course reaching back to the 
12 M. Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, Knopf Doubleday Pub-
lishing Group, New York 1977.
13 M. Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, New 
York 1990.
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traditional opposition, dividing methodological individualism and anti-in-
dividualism. It was a traditional individualist view that social and cultural 
phenomena are off-products or even the sum of individual acts. Such 
a standpoint was assumed, for example by the psychologistic theories of 
the threshold of the first half of the 20th century. Anti-individualist’s point 
of view assumed the contrary standpoint, that superindividual structures 
like language, social organization, ideology, etc. follow autonomous rules 
and determine the individual phenomena. It was the standpoint of authors 
as different as Hegel, Comte, anthropological and sociological function-
alists and structuralists, up to and including Discipline and Punish. The 
conciliation of these points of view is usually deemed impossible, and the 
choices of the scholars always included more ideological commitment 
than the scholarly arguments. This is nothing surprising or exceptionally 
unhealthy, when both sides have strong scholarly arguments and still 
none of them seem decisive. Anti-individualism never managed to ulti-
mately exorcise the ontological dilemma haunting it from the beginning 
and expressed in the famous saying: “It’s not the culture, who paints the 
nails.” It also failed quite spectacularly when applied to the explanation 
of the empirical behaviour of the individual. On the other hand, the in-
dividualist didn’t do any better, while dealing with any phenomena of an 
obvious group character: the rules of marriage, systems of kinship, social 
stratification, and above all language. Individualistic solutions to these 
problems create an encyclopaedia of forced scholarly inventiveness. These 
were exactly the problems that could be easily and convincingly solved 
from the anti-individualist point of view.
The debate proved to be inconclusive and is sometimes treated today 
as belonging to the history of humanities, and yet every scholar of human 
affairs still is making such a choice when trying to work. The current ten-
dency seems to favour the individualist solution, especially when dealing 
with contemporary Western societies of loosened cultural regulation and 
high individualization. This tendency is visible in anthropological practice, 
especially in the anthropology of contemporary societies, of replacing the 
idea of culture with “the cultural,” no longer objectified but treated as an 
aspect of a holistic act. No longer is the culture indentified as the object 
of research but as a cultural dimension of human activities. The same 
tendency within history is marked by similar shift in terminology, from 
the “history of culture” to “cultural history.” As long as this tendency is 
justified by the belief, that the individualization of modern life renders 
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group structures less important, it could be repelled: the decomposition 
of shared knowledge and values seems to be accompanied now by the 
unprecedented functional integration of society thanks to labour organ-
ization, patterns of consumers’ behaviour, etc. But the tendency towards 
methodological individualism doesn’t need to rely on this particular justi-
fication. It is justified enough by the effectiveness of both the individualist 
and anti-individualist points of view in different explanatory areas and 
the lack of any decisive closure to the old debate.
The point of view that I try to assume here tries to find some way out 
of this situation. It can be elucidated in the following way.
Only individual people think, act, produce and communicate. But 
everything that is said, written, produced or done becomes separated 
from the acting person. The basic mechanics of this process has been 
recognized and described in the 19th century by Hegel and Marx. First 
is what Hegel calls “inequality of intention and effect”: everything we do 
is determined by materials and circumstances that we don’t fully control 
and which inevitably enters the intersubjective space, where other peo-
ple will act in a way we can neither predict nor control. The last factor 
is especially important for every act of communication, rendering every 
meaning the object of social manipulation. What we had intended to do, 
then, never equals to what we have actually done and the effects of our 
acts stand against us as an outer reality. Things, thanks to other people, 
gain a history separate to the maker’s intentions, like a painting covered 
by hundreds of years of interpretations. And we never act alone: while 
other people act we meet their actions and their products as part of the 
outer reality and we do with them what others did with the effects of our 
acts. In the end, nobody fully controls the world of the effects of human 
acts and this world itself seems to follow some set of impersonal rules. 
It stands against us as a reality that requires understanding, if we are to 
act effectively. For example, every economic act is ultimately done by an 
individual: some empiric person is buying, selling, speculating, estimating 
the risk, etc. But the effects of many such acts are out of anybody’s full 
control, stand out as a reality we call the market, and have to be studied 
as an autonomous whole if we want to enter it into a successful way. In 
this process individual acts and their results are “alienated” from acting 
individuals and become themselves parts of the world that we must deal 
with. Even a philosopher who cannot be suspected of any sympathy for 
Hegel or Marx, Karl Raimund Popper, implicitly accepted this reasoning 
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when he distinguished his famous “third world” of objectified and auton-
omized products of human acts, next to the worlds of the physical and 
the psychical.14 We can call culture, following Hegel, alienated thinking. 
It doesn’t mean we follow Hegel any further: such an expression is only 
a way to emphasize the fact that every individual stands against the world 
that is already given and cannot be fully in control, and in effect forms 
a part of  reality. From this point of view, elements of culture, like the 
grammar of the language or the system of law are as hard a reality as the 
realm of the physical. Outer reality then is the place from where we take 
also semiotic systems, even if we creatively use them as tools, thanks to 
which we can become aware of ourselves. 
Everything individual is, then, social and everything social becomes 
individualized: it’s a vicious circle of human reality, from which both meth-
odological individualists and anti-individualist try to isolate the “ruling 
side.” There’s probably not such a side and maybe a circle is not so vicious – 
everyday we manage to live within it more or less successfully, hanging 
between the singularity of the body and the general character of language. 
This situation doesn’t allow any questions on the genetic primacy of the 
social or the individual: we have to yet find a proper pre-culture people. 
And even if we did, we would need to somehow communicate or interact 
with them. From this far ahead they would be no longer pre-cultural. But 
just as we lack an individual before culture, we never find culture outside 
of individuals: everything we reconstruct is someone’s act, product or 
utterance. If I am even slightly right, methodological individualism and 
anti-individualism are different cognitive perspectives, favouring different 
aspects of human life as objects of their study. Both have proved effective in 
their proper areas, and a scholar may still choose between them according 
to scientific needs or preferences. Rather it’s the tendency to reduce one 
to another or to reject one in the name of another that seems to be a dead 
end. Anyway, this is how culture seems to become superindividual.
14 K. R. Popper, The Tanner Lecture on Human values, delivered on April 7, 1978.
Chapter 5
Troubles with culture
What I am trying to do here, is do dispel the doubt over whether the 
proposed concept of culture, supposed to solve at least some problems 
touching the idea of mentality, does not evoke the very same dilemmas as 
mentioned thus far. One such problem, already mentioned above, is the 
enforced unification of diversified individual and group ways of thinking 
and acting into an artificially created whole. But any culture, even what 
we previously called a “sleeping culture,” is always an object of constant 
diversification. This process requires somewhat closer attention.
Contemporary cultural research, either empirical, historical or the-
oretical is especially sensitive to internal conflicts and contests, to any 
kind of group or individual resistance, and for a reason. This sensitiveness 
comes from the anthropological conceptions of hybridization and from the 
post-Foucault analysis of discourse, but also from detailed ethnographic 
and historical studies. These are not necesserily very recent studies. Ta-
deusz Manteufel,1 studying movements of voluntary poverty in the Latin 
Middle Ages, showed the hybrid, diversified and conflict ridden character 
of Latin medieval culture and he did it many decades ago. No supposed 
cultural monolith stands under the closer examination, and experiences of 
microhistory have taught humanists to look very closely. New sensitiveness 
to differences and conflicts can’t be then denied.
In the terminology proposed here we should consider not only the 
perspectives of the differentiated individual use of cultural knowledge, 
but primarily internal group-conflicts within the seemingly integrated 
1 T. Manteufel, Narodziny herezji, PWN, Warsaw 1963.
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culture. Every culture, supposedly every possible culture, but for sure 
every culture actually met, is internally diversified and open to potential 
conflict (and more often than not ridden with very actual conflicts). Con-
temporary humanities and social sciences recognized few important lines 
of division determined by social organization, but reflecting strongly on the 
level of shared cultural knowledge and processes involving it. The social 
division of labour should probably be named first; it also has the longest 
tradition of specialized research, including not only implied economic 
stratification but also class structure. Nobody would today deny that the 
“medieval culture” of the French peasants is something different than the 
“medieval culture” of the Aquitanian knights or something different than 
the “medieval culture” of the Byzantine monks and the “medieval culture” 
of the city-dwellers of Tuscany. Although seemingly obvious, differences 
of this kind are sometimes even now surprisingly omitted, generally in 
the case of traditional and no longer lively discussed – but still function-
ing – concepts. A good example is the presentation – not by professional 
historians but in popular discourse and in educational practices – of the 
culture of the Polish szlachta in the 16th and 17th centuries as “Old Polish 
culture,” without limiting it properly to only one group of past Poles. It is, 
of course, less about methodological errors and more about ideological 
choices. 
As obvious as class divisions – whoever of the theoreticians we will 
follow in respect to the concept of social class – are the divisions based 
upon ethnicity or religion. Both anthropological tradition – starting even 
with the proto-ethnographers of the 16th century, usually Jesuit mission-
aries – and recent cultural studies pay close attention to stratifications 
and conflicts connected with differences of gender and age. The struc-
tural differentiation of culture according to lines of social organization, 
to differences of class, age and gender and connected with geographical 
organization (like the rural-urban opposition), seem to precede individual 
differences. Detailed study of any actual culture may supposedly discover 
some other stratifications of this kind, sometimes of a unique character; 
in this regard studies dedicated to contemporary postindustrial societies 
are especially enlightening.
Culture, then, as the object of scholarly research, can be described as 
a system of differentiated subcultures and these subcultures are further-
more subjects to processes of individualization of different degrees. For 
these reasons, many processes within a unit that is researched as distinct 
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culture are similar to intercultural processes. Three main forms of rela-
tions between distinct class, gender, etc. subcultures should probably be, 
then, regulated by systems of communication, exchange and violence. 
Of course, distinction of these three systems is a theoretical idealization, 
because in empiric study we meet mixed forms, when one of these systems 
functions as an environment for others (some situations of violence may 
be an exception to such a rule). 
Of these systems, only the system of communication may be relatively 
effectively researched form a purely cultural point of view, while systems 
of exchange and violence require the application of a sociological perspec-
tive. The term “communication” denotes here the whole set of semiotic 
processes both within a distinct culture and between cultures. It is, then, 
a very wide concept, including what is usually distinguished as commu-
nication, manifestation, symbolization or expression. This is of course 
a very complex process, and scholars differ in their opinions, whether 
such a process can be explained by extending the analyses of linguistic 
communication. Let’s assume the communication involving two distinct 
subcultures of the same culture. Taking again the example in Aaron 
Gurevich’s spirit, let’s imagine an 11th century, Gallician peasant listening to 
a sermon – the only part of the liturgy presented in his vernacular, provided 
by an educated member of the Latin docti. If the sermon deals with, for 
example, the saints and their theological function, we can expect a very 
distinctive situation. The priest will be preaching from the perspective of 
rationalistic, theological knowledge, but his utterances will be interpreted 
by the peasant according to the rules of a magical culture, in which he still 
participates – the line that divides participants of this communication is 
exactly what Weber described as the “first disenchanting of the world.” 
Trying to understand the difference between what the priest said, and what 
the peasant heard, we will recall first the rules of the used vernacular lan-
guage, probably langue d’oc in this case, but this reference will not suffice. 
For many utterances or even singular words, the reconstruction of 
semantic presumptions will be needed and can show that although our 
communicators share some deal of cultural knowledge – because they 
belong to the same social organization – they still differ significantly in 
many points of their image of the world. These differences, equipping 
the same utterances with different semantic presumptions, including 
evaluating ones, cause an inequality between the told and the heard. Why 
even call it “communication”? Wouldn’t the name “discommunication” 
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be more proper? If we had reserved the name “communication” for only 
such a situation when the communication sent is perfectly equal to the 
communication received, we would then limit ourselves to artificially 
constructed formal languages that lack semantic presumptions, and in 
conclusion reject the very idea of cultural communication. While this is 
not a solution unheard of – it can be even obvious from the point of view 
of cybernetics and some forms of radical, philosophical epistemology – it 
doesn’t help much cultural theory or history. Inequality of the message sent 
and received is recognized well by many humanist concepts, like herme-
neutic philosophy or deconstructivist literary criticism, and expressed in 
the famous maxim “every reading is misreading.” The theoretical notions 
contained in conceptions of the cultural image of the world, and semantic 
presumptions seem sufficient to explain this situation.
Internal cultural exchange denotes here the process during which the 
element of a distinct subculture is taken by another subculture with or 
without a change of its function and meaning. The difference between 
communication and exchange can be easily illustrated. The assimilating 
and integrating of elements of the Christian world-image by the European 
medieval peasantry included both communication and exchange process-
es. Changes within the peasants’ image of the world can be explained as 
the effects of communication, but for example the assimilation of “Gre-
gorian water” as a magical object used in rituals of fertility is the case of 
exchange. The Christian meaning of holy water was neither interpreted 
nor assimilated: just the opposite, both the meaning and the functioning 
of holy water within Christianity has been abandoned and replaced with 
new ones. Another case: in European folk music from many regions 
the tonal structures typical for Franco-Roman liturgical music are quite 
regularly met. This is also a good example of cultural exchange: assimi-
lating structures typical for plainchant didn’t require the understanding 
or even awareness of its rules, formulated by Carolignian scholars, or its 
symbolism or tonal relations, but bases upon treating the plainchant as 
a set of “ready-mades” or patterns for imitation, that could be taken and 
used, either in their entirety or in any fragments (or even by borrowing 
some distinct features). One more musical example: the difference between 
communication and exchange can be illustrated by the difference of at-
titude towards folk music that divides ethnomusicologist and practicing 
musician. Ethnomusicologists aims at the understanding of folk musical 
culture and presentation of this understanding to educated readers (for 
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whom folk music is usually the product of an alien subculture). The 
researcher then assumes the attitude of hermeneutics in its most literal 
meaning, as a translator working on the threshold of differing subcultures 
and evoking processes of communication (even if the effect of this work 
may be a one-directional, and then limited, communication). A  prac-
ticing musician, say a rockman, including elements of folk music in his 
production, follows different a set of cultural rules, and it is enough if he 
can appropriate these elements without even worrying about their original 
context and meaning. Exchange is enough for him. 
Of course the distinction between cultural communication and ex-
change is of an idealizing character as far as both these systems will usually 
work together. Still, they can be researched separately – this made the 
diffusionism in anthropology even possible, regardless of its later critiques. 
Theoretically, a “pure” pole of exchange would probably have to be limit-
ed to the transmission of tools, techniques and other elements, that can 
be sufficiently characterized by their functions and uses. The processes 
of communication and exchange find their point of indifference, on the 
other hand, in the assimilation of signs.
The third mode of internal relations between subcultures takes the 
form of violence, and even this phenomenon – maybe except for some of 
its extreme manifestations – remains closely interwoven with the process 
of cultural communication, because an act of violence, say, a public exe-
cution, can take the form of a sign. Some forms of symbolizing violence 
are even only possible within a symbolically integrated society. Two main 
dimensions of violence as a relation between distinct groups of society – 
and, for us, distinct subcultures – may be described by evoking the famous 
distinction between “domination” and “hegemony,” proposed by Antonio 
Gramsci.2 The term “domination” denotes the system of power-relations 
within a certain society, based upon a disproportion of material force 
thanks to techniques of control and oppression, that are supported by 
physical violence or that can effectively activate such violence at will. 
“Hegemony” on the other hand denotes control and power enforced by 
symbolic means, i.e. the control of one group of people over the cultural 
knowledge of another group thanks to systems like education, the media, 
etc. This is exactly what came to be known as “symbolic violence.” In the 
terms proposed here, the hegemony can be precisely described as a situ-
2 A. Gramsci, Prison Notebooks, Columbia University Press, New York 2011.
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ation when one group of people forms or modifies in its own interest the 
culture of another group, especially the evaluating judgements of their 
world-image, and it can happen both as an intercultural relation and as 
an internal one. In the case of domination purely cultural explanations 
will obviously not suffice, but also the study of hegemony involves the 
necessary study of “hard” social organization. Assuming the primacy of 
either domination or hegemony would make analysis simpler, but it would 
be hard to verify or falsify such an assumption; doubtless, though, these 
two forms of violence interact and modify each other.
Many effects of internal power-relations within culture and society 
could be pointed out and at least two of them seem to be prevalent effects 
of the game of domination and hegemony, involving images of the world 
and their human bearers. These are hierarchy and conflict (or contest, 
which can be interpreted as a different species of conflict). Every act of 
violence, both physical and symbolic, establishes the hierarchy of power. 
If power-relations can’t be deleted from the analysis of any sociocultural 
reality – that much of Michel Foucault’s heritage is doubtless – then also 
constant hierarchization as a process and sociocultural hierarchy as its ef-
fect should be studied for every sociocultural structure. It’s worth a special 
emphasis that not any given, this or another hierarchy, for example the 
hegemony of an elite artistic culture over a popular one, is a constant and 
necessary feature of the given culture, but the process of hierarchization 
itself, regardless of its content. Fernand Braudel emphasized hierarchy as 
a feature of every society for a reason. Hierarchies are reflected directly 
in their cultural images of the world and legitimized in this way, but their 
analysis still demands the study of their economical and social conditions.
And studying both the hierarchies contained in images of the world and 
hierarchies enforced by economical and political reality, allows to observe 
a phenomenon that I would call the latency of hegemony: the situation 
when changes in the cultural hierarchy of hegemony, i.e. the hierarchy of 
contesting axiological systems, discourses, etc., are latent to the changes in 
economical, political and social hierarchy of domination. Such a latency 
characterizes the aforementioned hierarchy of the elite and popular ar-
tistic culture in contemporary postindustrial societies. Under conditions 
of political democracy, the legitimacy of enforcing artistic hierarchies by 
traditional elites, including scholarly and academic elites, has been not 
only questioned, but withdrawn. And under unchallenged primacy of the 
market in regulating the circulation of symbolic products, the dominance 
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of popular culture is both unprecedented and probably unchallengeable 
at the moment. Which part of the artistic culture dominates now, in eco-
nomical and social terms, is currently without doubt. But this hierarchy 
of domination is, nevertheless, confronted with a web of inherited and 
still continued discourses, trying to reproduce on the level of their world 
image the older hierarchy, i.e. trying to secure the traditional hegemony 
for the elite artistic culture. This latent hegemony has already been chal-
lenged: with contemporary discourses questioning the social position 
of the elite arts and “high culture” in general, proposed for example by 
cultural studies in English-speaking countries, which supplement current 
change in the structure of domination by analogous shift in the realm of 
hegemony, securing a new stability of the domination-hegemony system. 
Movement towards higher stability of this system doesn’t represent any 
“historical necessity” or “structural law” but a possibility that will or will 
not be actualized by acting human agents.
The opposite latency, the domination latent to hegemony or hegemony 
forming “the avant-garde of domination” is of course possible. Admitting 
only one direction of such a latency would be equal to claiming access to 
one of the traditional determinisms, either Marxist (or, in the softer ver-
sion, cultural-materialist), or idealistic, in fact post-Hegelian. For reasons 
provided further on, I would claim access to neither of them.
Even so simplified an example of changes within the domination-he-
gemony system already have made the second crucial effect of cultural 
hierarchization clearly visible.
The conflicts, in which the participants of different subcultures may 
find themselves, can be represented by two different models, the vertical 
and the horizontal. By vertical conflict I mean here the conflict between 
two forms of cultural knowledge, occupying different places in the social 
hierarchy and coming into contest; the previously mentioned conflict 
between contemporary discourses enforcing the hegemony of elite and 
popular artistic culture is still a valid example. Such a conflict is strongly 
connected with challenging the existing hierarchy and belongs to im-
portant factors of sociocultural change. The challenge to the hierarchy 
may prove successful or not, but even a failed attempt at changing the 
hierarchy can fruit in a new and different distribution of meanings, new 
strategies of interpretation, etc. Dependency between vertical conflicts 
and sociocultural hierarchies can be described as circular: the existing 
hierarchy itself, regardless of its actual shape, creates the possibility of 
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conflict, postponed as long as the domination-hegemony system remains 
effective. On the other hand, every vertical conflict not only challenges 
but also re-establishes conflict-producing hierarchy.
I use the term “horizontal conflict” to signify the conflicts between 
different subcultures and their participants, occupying an equal level of 
the sociocultural hierarchy. It can be exemplified by many querelles, en-
gaging competitive forms of art or scientific theories. Such a conflict, as 
history of the arts teaches, can follow at least two different paths. It may 
then produce a plurality. If two forms of art occupy similar positions 
within the domination-hegemony system, the conflict cannot be easily 
solved (agonizing options dispose equal power). Prolonged conflict of 
this kind, involving public arguments and manifestations, sometimes next 
to a few less sympathetic attempts, provokes its sides to develop a high 
awareness of their own options and more often than not to participate in 
a kind of artistic competition with good effects for everybody (and for 
the arts in the first place). The plurality of competing forms of avant-gar-
de art in the first half of 20th century, sometimes fiercely antagonized, is 
an enlightening example of such effects. But this plurality of contesting 
options may be replaced with a verticalization of the conflict: some of the 
options may find a way to associate themselves with such an element of 
sociocultural hierarchy, which, occupying a stronger position, can offer 
an advantage of power over the opponent. Something like this happened 
with the conflict of traditional and avant-garde art in Europe, first in the 
totalitarian regimes in Germany and the Soviet Union, where the tradi-
tional art, associated with political power – not necessarily by the choice 
of artists – gained an enormous advantage, and after World War II in the 
Western world, when thanks to its association with the power of state 
institutions and the political idea of its being “art of a Free World,” the 
Avant-garde gained a decisive advantage. As long as the conflict remained 
horizontal, it produced heterogenic “third and fourth options,” like what 
Milan Kundera refers to as “anti-avant-garde modernism,”3 represented 
by Pablo Picasso, Igor Stravinsky, Franz Kafka or Thomas Mann. The spe-
cifics of non-avant-garde modernism in music has been also recognized 
by Hermann Danuser.4 Politically enabled verticalization of the conflict 
during the Cold War changed the situation, assigning to only one side 
3 M. Kundera, Testaments Betrayed: An Essay in Nine Parts, HarperCollins, New York 
1996.
4 H. Danuser, Die Musik des 20. Jahrhunderts, Laaber-Verlag, Laaber 1984.
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the tools of both domination and hegemony: through the management 
of artistic institutions, academic discourses, expositional space, media 
support and money. After World War II, this situation has been even called 
in Poland “the dictatorship of the Avant-garde” (as far as I know, Tadeusz 
Szeligowski coined the phrase before it became almost colloquial). The 
horizontal contest has been reshaped as much more dynamic and as the 
vertical conflict of power-structures.
For a cultural theoretician, writing after Foucault and many other anal-
yses of cultural phenomena in terms of power relations, it’s always easy 
to overemphasize their impact. Structures of domination and hegemony, 
especially the latter, tend to overshadow the importance of more “classical” 
forms of violence, like criminal and military violence. It’s not out of place 
then to emphasize, for reasons both theoretical and methodological, 
that these relations form a nexus with systems of communication and 
exchange, and some of them, like hegemony, are in fact determined by 
communicational processes. The statement that the sociocultural sphere 
in general may be defined as a field of clashes, conflict and contest is one 
more reductionism, as doubtful as the previous, economical, geographical, 
etc., reductionisms. Even taking part in a sociocultural contest cannot be 
fully described in terms of power-relations. Let’s continue our example. The 
artistic contests and conflicts of the 20th century activated all axiological 
systems of an aesthetic, ethical and cognitive character, and participants 
of the contest did not always instrumentalize them for the needs of their 
struggle. For the cultural historian or theoretician, the artist’s belief in 
aesthetic autonomy is not “ideology” but part of his image of the world, 
it is a matter of fact. Reducing human beliefs to their function within 
power-relations cancels all the profits of the theory of cultural knowledge, 
trying to deal with the real content of human consciousness. This remark 
may seem obvious, but it’s worthy of writing down, even if only to separate 
the option proposed here from reductionists’ the position, that involve 
the same traditions, namely, of Gramsci and Foucault.
All my reasoning so far can be summarized as follows. Culture is under-
stood here as socially shared knowledge, divided in to two main spheres: 
the cultural image of the world and normative-directival knowledge. The 
cultural image of the world is stratified and includes the strata of a cate-
gorial system, of descriptive judgements about the world, of axiological 
valuations of the world and of shared “emotional styles.” The ultural 
image of the world is the source of semantic presumptions for cultural 
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norms and communicative units, and the normative-directival knowledge 
connects culture with human acting as a regulatory element or as a tool. 
Culture as a whole is accessible thanks to processes of communication 
and then depends on the features of corresponding semiotic systems. 
Culture is more or less heterogenic and within it a set of subcultures can 
be distinguished. Processes involving distinct subcultures can be described 
as the interaction of systems of violence, exchange and communication. 
This interaction affects – amongst others – the internal hierarchies and 
conflicts. Culture, as a superindividual sphere, is constructed thanks to the 
cognitive procedures applied by a historian, anthropologist, geographer, 
etc., and it doesn’t form any kind of ontologically separate entity. This 
construction is justified by the observed phenomena of sharing beliefs 
and by repeatable patterns of behaviour.
Such a concept of culture doesn’t claim any privileged position amongst 
other similar concepts, but it seems to conceptualize in a somewhat or-
dered way the sphere traditionally described, at least in the important 
parts of history, by the notoriously unclear term “mentality.” Conceptual 
order is not the only profit though; such a concept allows a theoretical 
integration of the historical knowledge gained by the history of mentality 
and may even inspire some historical research.
This conclusion closes the first part of my considerations and allows 
a transition to a second crucial question: how culture is related not only 
to social practices but also to the external conditions of these practices? 
Divided into more detailed and specific questions this problem can be 
considered as a matter of the relations between human acting, social organ-
ization and material conditions: economic, technological and geographic. 
We’ve already been dealing with the first aspect, the relation between 
cultural knowledge and human acts, and the point of view assumed here 
should be now clear enough. Also, the second aspect has been already 
touched upon, thanks to the problems of hierarchy and conflict. Still there 
remains a problem of economic and geographic conditions. The solutions 
proposed by Jerzy Kmita, Arnold Toynbee and Fernand Braudel seem to 
provide a good starting point for its consideration.
Chapter 6 
Cultural, social and geographic
Upon further examination the theoretical model of the connection be-
tween culture and social practice proposed by Jerzy Kmita, so far intro-
duced here only in elements, can surprise, because it seems to suddenly 
reverse the hierarchy assumed by the Polish philosopher during the process 
of the defining of culture. If at first cultural norms and directives were 
assumed to regulate, in the subjective-rational mode, the human activities 
of which social practice consists, now even the presence of these norms 
and directives is described as functionally determined by the needs of 
social practice and its conditions.1 
But what exactly does Kmita mean, when he speaks about “func-
tional determination?” For a moment we need to follow his ideas on 
epistemology, starting with separating functional determination and the 
respective functional explanation from other forms of determination and 
explanation. We’ve already introduced Kmita’s concept of subjective-ra-
tional determination and a type of explanation connected with it, i.e. the 
subjective-rational explanation or humanistic interpretation. Now we can 
limit our effort to a presentation of the concepts of causal, function and 
functional determination. 
We speak about a causal relation between two states of affairs a and 
b under two conditions: b is not later than a (it may be then concurrent) 
and a is a sufficient condition of b (b happens always when a happens). 
If this is the case, we call a the cause and b the effect, and the relation 
between them the causal determination. Causal determination connects 
1 J. Kmita, Kultura i poznanie, PWN, Warsaw 1985.
66 Chapter 6
particular and singular states of affairs, but causal explanation, having 
a general character, formulates the rule (law) governing this connection: 
it establishes the causal relation between the classes of the states of affairs 
A and B, containing respective states of affairs a and b. Causal explanation 
takes, then, the form of a general law, like “if a state of affairs belonging 
to the class A happens, then a state of affairs belonging to the class B has 
to happen.” Causal determination is, of course, well recognized in episte-
mology and there is no danger of mistaking it with functional explana-
tion (even if, according to Ernest Nagel, functional explanations can be 
interpreted as the re-wording of causal explanations2). The case is not so 
obvious with the distinction of function and functional determinations, 
proposed by Kmita.
The usual mix-up in this regard is caused mainly by linguistic habit 
allowing to use the term “functional” to cover both these different forms 
of explanation (sadly, Kmita’s terminological distinction is far away from 
being widely used in epistemology, but here we’ll try to follow it conse-
quently). But more important is the mixing of two different meanings 
of the word “function,” because it does denote two different concepts. 
The first is the mathematical concept of function (avoiding formal 
definition in terms of Cartesian products, we can just say that it’s a relation 
in which every input is related to one and only one output). This is the 
concept of function provides the foundation for what Kmita calls “func-
tion explanation.” Such explanations relate some set of inputs with the set 
of unique permissive outputs (it is for example, the relation between time 
and velocity in any motion of constant acceleration, or between time and 
the road in the motion of constant velocity). The regularity which gov-
erns relations of this kind should be expressible as an equation, defining 
exact dependencies between input and output. The possibility of such 
explanations in the social sciences has been allowed by important schol-
ars, like Claude Lévi-Strauss and others, although nobody has managed 
to propose any reasonable criteria to judge a correctness of establishing 
such a relation between states of affairs that cannot be quantified. It’s good 
enough reason, valid as long as a set of such criteria is not proposed, to 
postulate the limitation of function explanation to quantified phenomena 
(of course, present in researching sociocultural problems, for example in 
demography or economics). Moving outside of these limits and applying 
2 E. Nagel, The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation, 
Hackett, Indianapolis 1979.
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function explanation to phenomena like cultural knowledge seems not 
only problematic, but also, to be honest, like faking science.
Functional explanations recall a different meaning of the word “func-
tion,” understood now as a role, fulfilled by a given element in some general 
system. This meaning should be separated from the mathematical one and 
usually is assumed both in biology and in the everyday use of language. 
If functional explanation relies, generally, on pointing out the function of 
an element within a broader system, then it needs a set of cognitive tools 
to recognize such dependencies. More formally, the concept of functional 
determination can be elucidated as follows. 
Given here is a relational system R, characterized by possession 
of a global property (i.e. feature, quality or characteristic) P(R). Elements 
of R are of course connected by relations in the meaning of set theory, and 
the global character of P(R) means, that it is not a property of any element 
but of a system as a whole. The motion ability of a mammal’s organism can 
be an example of such a property, if we take this organism as a relational 
system. The relational system contains elements e1,...,en, and these elements 
are characterized by their different states (for example the element of the 
organism, the heart, can, hopefully, assume the state of rhythmic contrac-
tions). States of elements can be considered not only as isolated, but also in 
their series. Let’s imagine such an exemplary series including contractions 
of the heart, level of oxygen in blood, qualities of muscles and neurons, 
etc. We can distinguish series of states of elements within the system of the 
“mammal’s organism” that is responsible for maintaining  the property 
“motion ability.” Furthermore, if the series had been cancelled, the property 
would disappear. We can then say that maintaining the global property 
P(R) in the relational system R is the function of a given series of states 
of elements, or in different words, that the series of states of elements is 
functionally determined by maintaining the global property P(R) in the 
system R (the same system may be of course considered from the point 
of view of its other global properties). The system of these dependencies 
we call a functional system in respect to the given global property. The 
mammal’s organism can be then described as a functional structure in 
respect to its motion ability (or to many other global properties), and states 
of its elements can be considered as functionally determined. Functional 
explanation is, of course, founded upon recognized causal relations, as 
the states of elements are causally connected with different states of the 
system (once again in agreement with Nagel’s remarks).
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Explanations of this kind, regardless of their formalization, are abun-
dant both in biology and the social sciences, and functional determina-
tion was occasionally raised in anthropology or sociology to the level 
of the organizational basis of society. Theories proposed by Bronisław 
Malinowski, Talcott Parsons and in some elements by Karl Marx and 
even Émile Durkheim are proper examples. Many sociologists, including 
Anthony Giddens,3 provides us with extended critiques of systematic 
functionalism. Also, sociological tradition reaching back to Max Weber 
is not very friendly to this kind of social theory. Kmita’s conception is 
difficult to interpret in this point, as he seems to be very close to system-
atic functionalism, while at the same time he follows the options widely 
recognized as the opposite: the theory of cultural knowledge and Weber’s 
concept of rational acts.
Kmita claims, then, that social practice and culture (in his narrow defi-
nition, i.e. limited to norms and directives) forms a functional structure in 
respect to a specific global property: the reproduction of the objective con-
ditions of production. The latter are understood, in accordance with Karl 
Marx, as the conjunction of productive forces and relations of production. 
Reproduction of these conditions is conditio sine qua non for the endur-
ance of any society: breaking the continuity of reproduction threatens the 
biological and economical fundaments of society and may even eventually 
cause its destruction. Still following Marx, Kmita differentiates two kinds 
of material reproduction: simple reproduction and extended reproduction. 
The former relies on the non-regressive reproduction of initial conditions, 
while the latter is characterized by a constant extension and development 
of productive forces and the relations of production. For different socie-
ties, either simple or extended reproduction may be considered as their 
global property. The necessity of economic reproduction determines di-
rectly the practice of production, economic exchange and consumption 
(Marx’s “material practice” or in Kmita’s terms “basic practice” – at term 
probably more appropriate, as it includes such a non-material element as 
the relations of production). 
There are, of course, some conditions for basic practice: some system of 
moral norms or norms of law, securing the economic exchange, some sys-
tem of social communications, etc. Such systems, only indirectly – but still 
functionally – are determined by the property of economic reproduction. 
3 A. Giddens, Functionalism: Après la lutte, „Social Research” 43/1976.
 Cultural, social and geographic 69
Furthermore, the normative system requires some kind of legitimization, 
that can be secured by religions or ideologies, and religions or ideologies 
require both semiotic systems to be communicated and other social prac-
tices, like the public cult and rituals, to gain their normative force. All 
these dependencies form a complex, functional hierarchy, and the system 
of social practice and culture can be in effect described as a hierarchical 
functional structure. Here Kmita still follows Marx, although against many 
forms of Marxism, claiming for example direct dependency between the 
arts and economics. The concept of hierarchical functional structure gives 
a solid content to Marx’s remark on “determination in the last instance.”
Social practice and culture can be considered as functional structures 
with respect to global properties other than economic reproduction – 
Kmita is far from rejecting such options4 – but the primacy of simple 
reproduction is justified at least so far as no society, and then no culture, 
can endure without securing it.
What is original in Kmita’s theory is not necessarily his theoretical 
elaboration of the concept of hierarchical functional structure, neither 
even his disciplined definition of culture, but the risk he took by con-
necting two traditions considered to be in contradiction, functional 
conceptions and the concept of cultural knowledge, and unifying them in 
a single, coherent theory. Again, let’s start with a simplified example. Some 
honest Catholic believer and a nobleman lives in the Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth in the first half of the 18th century, regularly attending 
Roman Catholic mass. The Protestant dissidence in the country is now 
very weak, at least in comparison to its peak in the 16th century, and the 
group identity of the Polish szlachta is built largely upon the foundation 
of the Roman Catholic Church. Attending the mass is then first – in its 
social effects – a manifestation of solidarity with the rest of the “political 
nation,” i.e. the szlachta or nobility, but also an act of differentiation from 
other groups: the foreign nobility present in the country and the townsfolk, 
often Protestant and speaking German (we are, by the way, in the period 
of the famous anti-Protestant tumult in Torun). Our nobleman, on the 
other hand, probably still received a Jesuit upbringing, played his roles in 
school theatre, etc., and his religious passion is true. He follows both his 
religious needs and the need of social distinction, and may be fully aware 
4 G. Banaszak, J. Kmita, Społeczno-regulacyjna koncepcja kultury, Instytut Kultury, 
Warsaw 1994.
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of both these aspects – the concept of religion as instrumentum regni was 
well known in Poland at least from the time of Stefan Bathory – but only 
the subjective, religious intention must necessarily be conscious. Without 
a conscious intent, one cannot search for religious satisfaction (at least 
as long as we speak about cultural knowledge and not psychoanalytic 
“unconsciousness”), while group integration and differentiation will work 
wether intended or not. The behaviour, attending the mass, follows then 
both the structural function (social integration and differentiation), and 
the subjective intent (religious experience). The traditional division of 
theories would provoke here a question of “true” explanation: which one 
is right, the functional or subjective-rational? Kmita’s answer would be 
“both” are correct, in accordance with common sense. Instead of a the-
oretical contest, Kmita then proposes a different question: what’s the 
relation between the order of function and the order of meaning, if our 
behaviour follows both?
Kmita will ultimately admit the primacy of functional order, but ac-
cording to the following model. The whole of human rational acts, and sets 
of norms and directives regulating them, form a hierarchical functional 
structure and within this structure different functions must be fulfilled 
if the structure is to endure. From this point of view, the subjective aims 
followed by individuals are neutral, as long as the effects of individuals’ 
acts secure proper functions. The neutrality of subjective aims is a con-
sequence of the frame character of functional determination. The frame 
character of functional determination means that from the point of view of 
the stability of structure, it doesn’t matter which states of which elements 
secure a given function as long as the function is fulfilled. Functional 
determination, then, determines the functions to be fulfilled but not the 
ways in which society fulfils them. Practically, it means that any structural 
function can be fulfilled by a broad set of possible behaviour and its effects. 
It of course drastically weakens traditional determinism and separates 
Kmita quite radically from most of the functional theoreticians. Cultural 
knowledge in particular can be described as only partially functionally 
determined, because some of its elements may be functionally irrelevant 
(and couldn’t be then explained this way), and even elements function-
ally determined must only fit the functional frame in a way that cannot 
be deduced solely from the structure. At least these are the conclusions 
provoked by Kmita’s concept of “frame determination.” In the case of such 
functional structures as the “social practice-culture system,” the affairs are 
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complicated by their obvious diachronic character. Let’s hold a moment 
yet with a consideration of this problem.
Anyway, the idea of “frame functional determination” still allows the 
usage of functional explanations with respect to cultural, social and eco-
nomic phenomena, but renders such explanation insufficient; even more 
insufficient, if one doesn’t follow – and here we don’t – Kmita’s decision 
to limit the field of culture to normative-directival knowledge only. 
Another problem is the connection between the system of culture and 
social practice with its external conditions, above all geographic ones. In 
Kmita’s theory there is in fact only one significant connection of this kind. 
Environmental conditions are mediated by the concept of productive forces 
and they enter the realm of the social and cultural as natural resources, 
the source of food, sources of energy, etc. Although other connections 
were not explicitly excluded, they rather seem to occupy places beyond 
Kmita’s interest. Such a point of view implies the basic thesis of Marx’s 
anthropology on the universal mediation of the society-environment 
relation by labour. It’s obvious that such a conception is insufficient for 
any research concentrated on cultural knowledge, either historical or 
anthropological. The connections described by Marx and emphasized by 
Kmita remain the object of scholarly interest, but anyone dealing with 
cultural images of the world constantly meets other connections of an 
interpretational and symbolic character, from the vision of nature as the 
creation of a malevolent God within some forms of ancient gnosticism, 
through the Christian vision of nature as a “desert that calls,” up to the 
contemporary struggle against the reduction of the natural environment to 
productive forces, fought by ecological movements. In this respect, then, 
we must seek help in other conceptions, starting with one already recalled.
The solution proposed by Arnold J. Toynbee, the dialectic of challenge 
and response, although belonging to the classic repertoire of theories, 
still demands attention.5 It’s potential has never been fully actualized, as 
Toynbee’s conceptions remained for decades on the margins of scholarly 
interest, not without his own responsibility. The label “historiosophy” 
ascribed to Toynbee’s ideas is not accidental and cannot be blamed on 
historians’ professional prejudice against theory and philosophy. There is 
a crucial moment when Toynbee actually leaves the field of the theory of 
5 A. J. Toynbee, A Study of History, vol. I: Introduction. The Geneses of Civilizations, 
Part One and vol. II: The Geneses of Civilizations, Part Two, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford 1934.
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civilization and historical processes in favour of an ideologically commit-
ted philosophy of history, and it can be pointed out precisely, even if the 
British historian did not care to inform the reader, that the epistemological 
status of his utterances had suddenly changed.6 Describing the develop-
ment and succession of civilizations Toynbee introduces the concept of 
interregnum, as a chronological interval between successive civilizations, 
and claims, upon not bad historical evidence, that the structures usually 
enduring the decline of civilization, and then mediating between it and its 
successors, are churches. Churches then are responsible for the diachronic 
transmission of elements of civilization and become the medium of in-
tercivilizational processes in time. The obvious example is the Catholic 
Church, mediating between the ancient Mediterranean civilization and 
what we know as Western European civilization. So far, so good: regard-
less of the accurateness of his observations, Toynbee proposes a histor-
ical and theoretical approach. And suddenly, like deus ex machina, the 
dependency between civilization and churches is reversed: civilizations 
are now interpreted as discontinuous episodes within the continuous 
and progressive history of churches, and this history proves to realize 
the idea of spiritual progress. From this point of view the history itself is 
read as being disposed with inner meaning and aim, and this meaning of 
history becomes a responsibility of the churches. It would be difficult to 
find a more obvious example of the abandonment of history and theory 
for doubtful – because untouched by critical thinking – ideology, and 
the angry reactions of so many scholars are easily justified. But there still 
remains an open question, if the reader really has to follow Toynbee in his 
ideological turn, and if this turn, sympathetic or not, renders the historical 
and theoretical content of A Study of History altogether irrelevant? The 
theoretical theses proposed by Toynbee and his ideological turn do not 
seem to be logically connected, therefore the turn itself is arbitrary and 
not obliging. From my point of view, this is rather a virtue then a vice, as 
it makes the use of Toynbee’s theoretical achievements still possible, as 
long as we do not follow his arbitrary changes of perspective.
Sadly, problems with Toynbee’s propositions do not end here, however. 
Even interpreted in purely theoretical terms, his conception seems to repre-
sent an unloosened, nomothetic model and in consequence it must face all 
the arguments formulated during the debate on Hempel’s model of histor-
6 J. Marzęcki, Wprowadzenie, in A. J. Toynbee, Studium historii, PIW, Warsaw 2000.
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ical knowledge. Nomothetism of this kind seems especially incompatible 
with the cultural point of view, dealing with human interpretations of the 
world. But the status of general laws within Toynbee’s theory is somewhat 
unclear, and the respective chapter of A Study of History doesn’t bring many 
conclusions. On one hand, when considering the definition of civilization 
as the smallest explainable unit of historical research, Toynbee limits the 
validity of historical laws to the field of a particular civilization: what was 
the law for Victorian England, was not the law for Romanovs’ Russia, etc. 
The term “law” does not denote here a universal regularity, but a local 
regularity, determined by the specifics of a given civilization. The term 
“law” is, then, here rather misleading; it would be better to speak about 
civilizational regularity or about a structural rule or even about a grammar 
of civilization. If Toynbee had consequently used the term “law” in such 
a meaning, his “tough” nomothetism would be only a misunderstanding, 
caused by an unlucky terminological choice and it would be sufficient to 
replace his terminology. But Toynbee follows the much harder concept 
of general law when he elucidates his theory of the origins, development 
and decline of civilization. This time he tries to establish a set of general 
rules governing these processes and claims their universal validity – these 
rules form then general laws in the classical meaning. As general laws in 
the classical meaning they are probably false anyway, because they are 
falsified by any singular event that doesn’t follow them.
Still and against all the doubts lots remains valid, but this “lots” de-
mands interpretation and sometimes contradict Toynbee’s intentions. 
What cannot stand as a general law, however, can stand as a theoretical 
model. The model allows exceptions and allows alternative models of the 
same phenomena, governed by different theoretical questions; the model 
always can be perfected, polished and even rebuilt. To use all the potential 
hidden in Toynbee’s work it seems to be necessary to interpret his utter-
ances within a different theoretical framework and different methodology. 
It requires not only a careful division of the theoretical and historical ut-
terances from the ideologically committed philosophy of history, but also 
reading his sets of general laws as generalizing and hypothetical models 
of processes. Read in this way, Toynbee’s historical and theoretical models 
prove to be still extremely inspiring.
The model describing the connection between sociocultural structure 
and its external environment, formulated by Toynbee during his consid-
eration of the genesis of civilization, is then the model of challenge and 
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response. It assumes a dialectical dependency between the environment 
and a society active within it. The geographical environment is a challenge, 
that must be successfully answered under a threat of social disorgani-
zation or even of disabling the continuity of society. Examples of such 
geographical stimuli are the floods of the Nile, or the sands of Sahara. 
The effective answer, given by society, is not determined, but creative: 
the same stimulus can be answered in many effective ways, just like the 
Egyptian system of irrigation or the organization of the trans-Sahara trade 
based upon caravanserais are such answers. This model is not limited to 
geographical challenges, it covers also stimuli of social origin, like being 
conquered, living under the military pressure of another society, being 
discriminated against, etc. We can find a good example of differentiated 
creative answers to the same challenge in various forms of religious re-
newal answering to the new situation of Israel under the ultimate Roman 
conquest, like the movements of the kannaim (zealots) and chaweim 
(Pharisees) or Christianity. Another example, this time involving the 
challenge of the geographical environment, can be taken from medieval 
Scandinavia. Extreme environmental challenge, i.e. geological and climatic 
circumstances rendering agriculture barely possible, found an answer in 
replenishing the basic resources thanks to the extortion of the Viking raids 
(mainly in Norway and Denmark), but also thanks to the far reaching 
trade of the Swedish Varangians, emigration and mercenary work as far as 
Byzantium (like the famous Varangian Guard of Costantinople, before it 
became a largely Slavic unit). The model of challenge and response, being 
an open model – Kmita would probably call it a “frame model” – allows 
the explanation of actual events, but not a prediction (one more strong 
reason to interpret it as a model and not as a general law).
The dialectical aspect of Toynbee’s model lies in the fact that every 
successful answer interacts with the environment, producing a new chal-
lenge that requires new answer, etc. The system is not static, and the model 
describe a set of processes, demanding also – thanks to stimuli coming 
from other societies – intercivilizational analysis. An effective answer, 
given to some challenge by a society, may also prove to be a challenge 
for other societies, just like the effective response given by the Vikings to 
their environmental challenge proved to be one of the hardest challenges 
that the societies of the British Isles and northern Gaul ever faced, and 
one threatening the very existence of what we call “Western European 
civilization.”
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Toynbee gathered huge historical evidence to support the model of 
challenge and response, sufficient enough to prove it useful or even nec-
essary. The evidence is sufficient, though, only if we understand Toynbee’s 
model as one of many models of environmental relations, even if a cru-
cially important one, and not as a law of the origin of civilization. Fernand 
Braudel’s criticism was also directed against the latter interpretation and 
not against the usefulness of the model in historical explanation. From 
the perspective of the theory of culture the challenge-response model 
demands attention for two reasons: it’s an open, non-determinist model, 
as I have already emphasized, explaining also the situations of failure or 
those lacking a response. Additionally, it connects diversified elements of 
the superstructure, mediating between geographical, social and cultural 
elements. No unchanging hierarchy of structural dependencies needs to be 
assumed, as the response is supposed to be creative and to reshape those 
dependencies. Putting aside the attempt to present the challenge-response 
model as quasi-natural law, as a model of sociocultural change and a model 
of structural connections it remains even more open and mobile than 
Kmita’s conception of frame functional determinations.
Braudel’s approach to environmental dependencies has never been fully 
elucidated by him and lacks the theoretical articulation of Toynbee’s and 
Kmita’s theories. Still, it remains quite clear in his detailed analyses and can 
be reconstructed without a very big effort. Let’s start with such analyses, 
presented in Capitalism and Material Life7 and partially in A History of 
Civilizations.8 The first is dealing with the conditions that allowed the cre-
ation of monumental architecture in pre-Columbian Mesoamerica without 
a threshold in technology. Such a condition is first met by the availability 
of huge quantities of human labour to be used without replacing impor-
tant part of it thanks to technology. In agricultural societies of Mexico 
this human labour could be gained exclusively by limiting the number of 
days during the year that must be fully dedicated to tending the crops. The 
second necessary condition was the ability to organize and manage the 
freed labour force. The first condition can be fulfilled only in geographic 
circumstances that allow to base the food production on crops requiring 
low expenditure of labour. This condition was met in Mesoamerica thanks 
to corn farming. In comparison to wheat, millet or rice, agriculture based 
7 F. Braudel, Capitalism and Material Life 1400–1800, Harper, Colophon 1975. 
8 F. Braudel, A History of Civilizations, Penguin Books, London 1995.
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on corn can be characterized as extremely efficient in terms of the food 
gained/labour spent ratio. According to Braudel the expenditure of labour 
could be limited even to few dozens of days per year without risking fam-
ine and social disorganization. This gives incredible an quantity of labour 
disposable for other enterprises, be it architecture or military expansion. 
In consequence, limiting the labour expenditure thanks to technology is 
not necessary, if all the available labour can be organized thanks to an 
adequate social hierarchy, administration and enforced control. The exam-
ples of Toltec, Teotihuacan or Natchez come to mind. The labour can be 
also organized thanks to the execution of power over militarily conquered 
peoples by a relatively small but unchallenged group of conquerors as in 
the Aztecs’ empire. It doesn’t matter if the data available to Braudel still 
hold their validity, because we are trying to reconstruct his explanatory 
procedure, not the history of Mesoamerica. By the way, similar reasoning 
could be probably proposed for the dependency between whale hunting/
fishing and labour organization amongst the Kwakiutl and other commu-
nities of Northwest America or maybe even between maize farming and 
the forms of political activity of the Haudenosaunee (Iroquois). 
The second example concerns a very classical question: why in clas-
sical antiquity and ancient China nothing similar to the industrial revo-
lution ever happened, despite the presence of the required technological 
knowledge and skills? Mechanics, despite of its advancement, remained 
there a field of philosophical experiment, of entertainment or of luxury – 
a classic example of innovations that did not provoke any sociocultural 
change and a feature that strongly differentiates the modern industrial and 
postindustrial societies of Europe and China from their historical prede-
cessors. For a scholar who, like Braudel, tries to understand the process 
of industrial revolution, it is a question of crucial importance. There are 
some similarities to a former question, and a few elements of Braudel’s 
answer are also similar. The system of social organization, based on a strict, 
continually enforced hierarchy and precise distribution of functions, forced 
by agriculture based upon irrigation and especially by the Chinese “wet” 
rice agriculture, taking the sharpest articulation in ancient Mediterranean 
slavery, produced huge quantities of cheap labour. In such a situation even 
technologically sophisticated goals could be achieved by the extensive 
management of the available labour, and reducing the expenditure of the 
labour did not even appear as a problem to be solved, not even speaking 
about a pressing necessity. There was then no functional pressure to apply 
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the available knowledge to production. Quite the contrary: such an ap-
plication, freeing a lot of labour, could even undermine the social system 
based on slavery and/or administrational control. Of course, Braudel 
based his explanation on the available demographic and economic data. 
On a side note: it would be an interesting experiment to express the very 
same explanation in Kmita’s terms: in the societies of ancient China and the 
Mediterranean the simple reproduction was secured without the need of 
technological change. Such a reformulation reveals one more question, not 
appearing in Braudel’s questionnaire. Why, at a certain historical moment, 
did simple reproduction cease to satisfy Western societies and the necessity 
of change started to be forced by the needs of extended reproduction? 
We can reverse this question: every known society applies some kind of 
technology, be it bow and arrow or flint tools, that are proofs of former 
change and the former extension of the means of production, thus every 
society went through a period of extended reproduction – what is the rea-
son then of re-establishing the rule of simple reproduction within so many 
societies? To a broad extent it is a question which addresses the specifics 
of the Western world, which we, of course, do not attempt to solve here.
Two models, slightly differing but complementary, of environmental 
conditioning may be deduced from Braudel’s exemplary analyses. The 
first is the model of the environment as a limit-setting factor: the envi-
ronment, social or geographical, limits the spectrum of possible changes 
of any given elements or sub-structure. In this way the climatic conditions 
of agriculture – on a given technological level – set a limit for the labour 
force arising from food production, as the necessity of food production 
takes precedence in every society under the threat of depopulation and 
extinction (contemporary postindustrial societies are by no means an 
exception to this rule). The environmental conditions set obvious limita-
tions to accessible forms of material life (there will be no whale-hunters 
communities in medieval Bohemia...), just like the forms of material life 
set limits to the accessible forms of social organization (no nomadic “wet” 
rice farmers, of course) and group behaviour and even forms of cultural 
knowledge (no dolphin cult in inner Mongolia!). Again we find, then, 
a non-deterministic conception, based on a version of frame-conditioning.
The second model applied by Braudel is in fact a brilliant species 
of Toynbee’s challenge-response model: this time it’s a paradox situation of 
response without a challenge. It can be expressed like this: it’s the perspec-
tive of an industrial society, which recognized the impressive effectiveness 
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of technology as the response to the challenge of extended reproduction, 
that even allows to ask why such technology did not become a factor of 
civilizational change in ancient societies. In a society without a challenge 
of extended reproduction, technical innovations prove to be neutral; they 
don’t become a factor of change, as they are not placed within the func-
tional order of dependencies. A “response to a non existing challenge” is 
maybe the most effective way to explain why so many innovations fail to 
provoke sociocultural change of any kind. This claim, of course, doesn’t 
oppose the possibility of functionally neutral uses of such innovations, 
neither the possibility of their future functionalization. 
The models of environmental dependencies proposed by Toynbee and 
Braudel can be easily reconciled if we reject the interpretation of chal-
lenge-response dialectics as the law of the origins of civilization. Such 
a reconciled model can be elucidated in the following way, starting with 
the proper definition of environment. The environment is the whole of 
a system surrounding any of its distinguished subsystems; a web of inter-
dependencies connects the system with any of its sub-systems, and from 
the perspective of the subsystem these connections form the environmental 
conditions. The concept of the environment is then relative to the way in 
which we construct the general system and its subsystems. For example, 
a social structure can be assumed to be a subsystem of a broader system, 
containing geographical milieu, including climatic, geological, biological 
factors, etc. and all these elements form the environment of a social struc-
ture. We can speak then meaningfully about the geographical environment 
of the economic life, the economic environment of the processes of social 
stratification, or the social environment of the dissemination of cultural 
knowledge, as distinguishing systems and subsystems being governed by 
our scholarly interest and our questionnaire. 
The connection between any subsystem and its environment is of 
a frame character. The features of the environment don’t determine the 
features of a subsystem in a causative way, that could be expressed as a set of 
laws. The forms of the subsystem-environment dependency can be pointed 
out. First, there is the “all-too-familiar-for-us-now” form of a challenge to 
be creatively and then not fully predictably answered. Second, there is the 
matter of limitation – not the determination – of the possible forms of the 
subsystem (the environment more often than not makes some solutions 
impossible than it forces a determined behaviour). 
The environment is being constantly reshaped by human actions, 
including transformation within the sphere of cultural knowledge, and 
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the dynamics of the whole is going through continuous changes. The last 
feature is what Toynbee called “the dialectics” but it is a good moment to 
ultimately move away from this term. It served obediently to Toynbee’s shift 
from a theory of historical processes to unmasked historiosophy, when the 
challenge-response model was placed within the broad, dialectic frame of 
the progressive realization of truth, thanks to the sequence of universal 
churches (at this moment Toynbee achieved at last some philosophical 
resemblance to Hegelian dialectics). Additionally, it is being used in the 
theory of history in too many contradictory ways – it would be not pos-
sible, for example, to reconcile Toynbee’s idea of dialectics with Braudel’s 
use of the term, as the name for relations between historical processes of 
different duration. The term “dialectics,” however, generally suffers under 
the burden of so many philosophical uses that it seems a bad idea to use 
it outside of philosophical discourse, where all these uses could truly 
become meaningful. It’s tempting to replace Toynbee’s dialectics with 
a simpler term “feedback,” but that would be only one more metaphorized 
technical term. Let’s name then the system connecting a given element and 
its environment with the exact term “interactive structure.” Both Braudel 
and Toynbee treat the environmental dependencies in exactly this way.
One more example can illustrate such an interactive structure in action, 
showing the importance of different forms of geographical and social 
environment and challenge-response relations. Once again we can recall 
some facts from the history of North America.9
Before the colonial invasion, the vast terrains of Eastern Woodland 
and The Lakes had been inhabited by populations based upon either 
wild rice gathering or, more frequently, maize agriculture. The European 
pressure, as a challenge, could be – and was – answered in many ways, but 
probably even more important than King Philip’s war was the migration 
of many populations, among them groups of Dakota, westward, towards 
the Plains, where up to now practically only Blackfeet and Shoshone were 
regular inhabitants, contested by groups of seasonal hunters coming from 
surrounding agricultural societies like Skidi Pawnee. The refugees could 
try to rebuild their way of life based on farming, although this would not 
be easy, or become regular hunters replacing maize with buffalo. What was 
the factor which led to the realization of a second possibility and in effect to 
the creation of a new form of social life, known to us as the civilization of 
9 B. Trigger, W. E. Washburn (eds.), The Cambridge History of the Native Peoples of the 
Americas, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1996. 
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the Plains and popularly believed to be the “original civilization of Native 
America” (actually originating not before the 17th century)? The enabling 
factor seems to be rooted in intercultural exchange, as two fundaments of 
a new form of life, the horse and firearms, were taken – both figuratively 
and literally – from the invaders. The horse meant a new definition of space 
and new modus operandi – in fact, quite a new environment, unknown 
to the pedestrian Shoshone or Blackfeet – leading to a socio-economic 
organization unprecedented in North America: the societies of nomadic 
mounted hunters – and former farmers – centralized around hunting and 
war, the with Holy Trinity of buffalo, horse and gun (and fading memories 
of how “we lost the corn”). This techno-economical change provoked an 
analogous change in sociocultural structures: with the new definition of 
gender obligations and status, new forms of initiations thanks to the wide 
acceptance of Arapaho’s Sun Dance, etc. Within a culture based upon oral 
transmission these new elements were quickly traditionalized and includ-
ed into the cultural image of the world. When in the 19th century a few 
events like the discovery of gold in the Black Mountains and the necessity 
to protect Bozman and Oregon Trails created an opportunity to extend 
the colonial invasion westwards, the invaders met peoples under familiar 
names, but economically, socially and culturally reshaped. We can suspect 
that the new image of the world and new axiological systems were not 
of  secondary importance – along with the now limited possibilities for 
escape and further migration – to a different response to the same chal-
lenge of military and political pressure. Europeans on the other hand, for 
whom the Native America formed an intercivilizational environment, met 
this environment as changed, due to their own former actions: instead of 
the societies of pedestrian farmers armed with bow, arrow, club and shield 
there were mounted hunters-warriors, still armed with bow, arrow, club 
and shield but also with firearms and a new appreciation for war as a main 
form of social activity. The response now was, then, war, but not only war, 
also a political transformation, bordering on a new ethnogenesis, leading to 
broad coalitions – like the Dakota-Cheyenne-Arapaho coalition of the late 
19th century – based not upon kinship but territoriality. The response proved 
to be insufficient – the political transformation was in its childhood and, 
against the efforts of individuals like Red Cloud or Crazy Horse, the norma-
tive system governing war activities remained centralized around the set of 
ritualized war deeds and the individual prestige of warriors, while virtually 
neglecting the effectiveness needed as a governing value. The ineffective 
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response brought the Plains people to social disorganization and even to 
the verge of extinction, but also to a new challenge, created by the colonial 
situation. The biogeographical environment changed after the decimation 
of the Plains buffalo, rendering the continuation of the buffalo-hunters civ-
ilization impossible; the social structure ceased to function properly thanks 
to the enforced privatization of land property in the family farms system; 
economical and political independency was replaced by state-founded 
reservations; the cultural transmission was broken by the forced education 
of children according to European patterns and the propagation of Chris-
tianity. Toynbee’s model of “the stimulus of penalization” fits this situation 
perfectly. A new kind of response to this challenge develops up to today, 
starting with the Wovoka and Ghost Dance movement. Even if Ghost Dance 
was supposed to help get rid of the invaders in a religious way, after the 
military way ended with ultimate failure, it started a transformation towards 
overcoming the traditional conflicts dividing Native Americans and towards 
a new definition of group identity: not in the terms of kinship and tribal 
affiliation, but in terms of shared cultural heritage. This movement is being 
continued today in the form of the Pan-Indian identity of the “First Peoples” 
and has proved to be at least sufficient enough to preserve the remains of 
Native societies, and with time, to reforge the protected cultural heritage 
into a strong market offer within the contemporary economics of tourism.
The true analysis of this example could and should take into consider-
ation the whole multivolumed monograph, but even treated so roughly it 
makes the acting of the interactive structure, of environmental depend-
encies and of the challenge-response model, evident enough. We can see 
clearly how the environment, both geographical and social, provokes 
the responses and how it is changed in effect, providing new challenges, 
forming a non-teleological sequence. In my opinion, the possibility of 
such analyses is a strong argument in support of a model of environmental 
dependencies and sociocultural structure, proposed here thanks to the 
reconciliation of Braudel’s position with chosen elements of Toynbee’s 
formulation. The ability to generate acceptable explanations of historical 
events is the strongest virtue of any theory.
The explanatory efficiency of the proposed model may still be improved 
and I didn’t refer to Kmita’s model for bibliographical reasons. There is, 
of course, a similar emphasis put on the frame character of environmental 
causality in both Kmita’s conception and in our “Toynbee-Braudel mod-
el,” but there are also important differences. First, there is the difference 
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between the model of the interactive structure and Kmita’s model of hi-
erarchical structure, based upon Karl Marx’s diachronic functionalism. 
Second, there is the difference between the many forms of determination 
in the “Braudel-Toynbee” model” and the strict functional connections 
in Kmita’s model. The former difference should be weakened. Within any 
interactive structure, when it is considered at a certain moment of time 
and according to a given questionnaire, a dominating direction of de-
pendencies and a current hierarchy of structural elements is inevitably 
established. The interactivity is of a diachronic character and the point is 
to remember that any given synchronic hierarchy is always an object open 
to diachronic change. Reduction of the interactive structure to a hierarchic 
one is then the effect of the synchronic point of view, and it is more and 
more difficult and problematic, if we consider the processes of longer and 
longer duration. There’s no reason, though, to oppose the recognition of 
current hierarchies within any sociocultural structure. On the other hand, 
there’s no reason to suppose that the hierarchy of dependencies described 
by Kmita is immobile and eternal. It’s easy to assume that Kmita’s own 
reconstruction of hierarchy and the relations between elements of struc-
ture is fully valid for certain societies in certain periods of time, but it 
may require revision in the case of other societies or different periods in 
the history of the same society. In my opinion, Kmita catches perfectly 
the hierarchy of functional dependencies within modern industrial and 
postindustrial societies or at least provides us with an ideal type of such 
a society, articulating – in Marx’s terms – it’s historical tendency (the 
tendency to replace all social relations with functional relations and to 
functionally subdue every human activity to economical development, 
while eliminating or marginalizing social practices that, like the history 
of culture, resist such an operation. This tendency is articulated to its 
fullest in neoliberal ideology, but it still not fully realized, being rather 
a postulated state of affairs). Kmita’s model can’t be, then, expected to fully 
fit non-industrial societies of the past.
It’s impossible to reject Marx’s and Kmita’s claim, that the reproduc-
tion of the conditions of productions is necessary for the survival of any 
society, but there’s no reason for assuming that securing this reproduction, 
especially simple reproduction, requires the subduing of all elements of 
the social structure and cultural knowledge (and there’s enough historical 
evidence to make such an assumption doubtful). Kmita’s model should be 
interpreted not as a universally valid description of sociocultural structure, 
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but as an idealizing model of a specific case of western capitalistic, industrial 
and postindustrial societies. I would move so far as to suggest, that the 
primacy of extended reproduction in these societies is not their “original” 
determinant but it is itself promoted by an axiological system based upon 
the central value of maximizing profit (and this is exactly the definition of 
capitalism as a form of social consciousness as followed by Fernand Braudel 
in the previously recalled study) By the way, in this perspective the contem-
porary postindustrialism can be interpreted as a radical capitalistic effort 
to extend the regulation by the value of maximizing the profit to the fields 
left at least partially outside by classic industrialism, like religion, fine arts 
or the humanities – practices that were considered to realize sets of values 
different than those capitalistic ones. Interpreted in this way, Kmita’s model 
remains a very effective tool for the analysis of societies both western and 
westernized, and it even allows for a very precise definition of westernization 
as such a reorganization of functional dependencies within a given society 
that aims towards the western model of functional unification.
Two more points still require a short commentary. The possibility 
of interactive and not necessarily hierarchical dependencies within the 
sociocultural structure was implicitly admitted by Kmita, at least in the 
form of  the interplay between “the order of functions” and “the order 
of meaning” so that both cross the sociocultural structures in different 
directions. And next, the assumption of the strict functional determination 
of all the parts of culture by the need of economic reproduction is possible 
only if Kmita’s narrowing of the concept of culture itself is first accepted. 
Kmita never claimed that his thesis is valid for all the broad sphere that 
he calls “the social consciousness.” If we extend, as we did here for reasons 
previously elucidated, the concept of culture to include socially shared 
images of the world, the situation complicates itself. It would be more 
than difficult to indicate a functional connection reaching in a mediated 
way to the conditions of production for many elements of world-images 
(what is, for example, the link between the conditions of production and 
the idea of the dream as a journey of the soul separated from the body?), 
up to a moment when explanations become tantalizingly arbitrary. This 
situation does not render functional explanations invalid; it even still 
allows to consider them as a privileged form of social explanation, but 
requires a careful estimation of their validity in every particular case.
After all these remarks the system “environment – social practice – 
culture” can be then described in the following way. It is an interactive 
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structure, interconnected by frame dependencies. The frame character 
of respective dependencies allows a multitude of variants of the realiza-
tion of the same structural dependency. The variability of the structural 
response is determined by the creative character of human acting (which 
may be, by the way, explained ethologically by a constant variability 
of human behaviour). Amongst the possible models of dependencies the 
functional model (the challenge-response dependency can be interpreted 
as a functional connection) and model of limiting choices by environmen-
tal factors (delimitation of the field of possibilities) have been pointed 
out. The hierarchies of determinations within the whole structure is the 
object of change, so it would be better to speak about a system organized 
by processes of continuous structuration, than about a structure. In this 
context, the phrase “functional need,” whenever it occurs, should be un-
derstood as a name for the structural relation without any psychological 
connotations, neither with respect to the individual nor social psychology. 
It should be obvious now that all the previous remarks on the impor-
tance of contest, conflict and internal diversification, formulated with 
respect to the concept of culture, remain valid also with respect to this 
broader structure. Such a theoretical model can be used as a tool in the 
creation of empirically or hermeneutically based, detailed models, aiming 
for the reconstruction of particular cultures. In this perspective, Kmita’s 
model – i.e. the model of hierarchical functional structure, determined by 
the necessities of economic reproduction – can be treated as an example of 
such a detailed elaboration (in this particular case, with respect to modern 
capitalistic, both industrial and postindustrial, societies).
Accepting the theoretical construct proposed here results in one 
particularly important conclusion that culture cannot be researched in 
isolation and treated as actually an autonomous entity or, to express it 
otherwise, that a valid object of research is always the totality of the sys-
tem and isolation of its elements fruits in drastic narrowing of the field 
of possible explanations. The history of culture, then, cannot be understood 
as a history of isolated phenomenon, namely, of cultural knowledge, but 
is always an integrated history of the whole environmental, economic 
social and cultural system, although governed by a specifically cultural 
questionnaire. It’s specifics lies in the fact that elements of the system other 
than culture enter the field of scholarly observation in their relation to 
the sphere of socially shared knowledge and are recalled to explain the 
processes occurring within this particular part of the structure. 
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I would gladly use the term “cultural history” instead the “history 
of  culture,” if it was not already used to denote a theoretical position, 
which, in accordance with a part of contemporary anthropology, tends 
to eliminate the very concept of superidividual structures, replaced with 
an idea of the “cultural dimension” of individual existence (I’ve already 
expressed my doubts concerning this way of thinking). 
I believe that the position achieved here remains in accordance with 
the demands formulated by historians active during the 1930s and 1940s, 
especially by Bloch and Febvre, and with their project of “integrated” or 
“integral” history. And of course I have to accuse the history of mental-
ity of an improper isolation of one element, now privileged, of a much 
broader structure. The whole of the interactive and diachronic structure 
is always an object of research for history, sociology, anthropology or 
cultural studies, although disciplines differ thanks to their methods and 
questionnaires. Repeating the description of the whole of this structure 
every time, one needs to mention, is hardly convenient though. Toynbee 
proposed to use the old term “civilization” to denote “the smallest possible 
unity of historical explanation.” Although the tradition of the “civilization – 
culture” opposition is quite complex and differs in different languages, 
there’s no reason, I believe, to reject his proposal. To make it clear, then, 
and avoid unnecessary confusion: I use the term “culture” to denote so-
cially shared knowledge, including world-images and normative-directival 
knowledge, and the term “civilization” to denote a structure connecting 
environmental conditions, social practices (including economic practice), 
social organization and culture. The term “civilization” in this usage is not 
related then to “material” as opposed to “spiritual” nor to an “advanced 
society” as opposed to a “primitive” one. This is also the way Braudel used 
the term “civilization” in his A History of Civilisations, although he tried at 
the same time to preserve the civilization-culture opposition with respect 
to technological advancement, an opposition completely abandoned here. 
No civilization is ever fully isolated and every study of civilization 
includes a study of intercivilizational (and, obviously, intercultural) pro-
cesses. The main topics of such a study have been already introduced with 
respect to the internal relations within culture, and it’s enough to name 
them here again: communication, exchange and war (as the intercivili-
zational equivalent of internal violence). Maybe the order of these topics 
should be reversed, to emphasize their respective importance. Not with-
out a reason Toynbee claimed that historically the basic form of contact 
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between civilizations is that of assault. Even if civilizations are explicable 
as relatively separate and coherent wholes, their study is always open to 
intercivilizational extensions – and in this way every history becomes 
inevitably, as Braudel was fully aware, a global history.
Chapter 7
Cultures and time
The previous short remarks on the processes of structuration replacing 
the concept of established structures, like a few other remarks, remind 
once and again about the specifics of any historical research, including 
any cultural topics. This specifics is of course the diachronic point of 
view. The discussion of this aspect of the history of culture has been 
now delayed enough. I’ve started with associating myself with Bloch’s 
definition of history as a study of people in time, and almost exclusively 
filled the previous pages with a discussion of the synchronic and struc-
tural approaches. Adding now time as the next dimension to the already 
characterized structures would be a misleading strategy. To avoid this, 
I shall discuss the problem of time under two main topics: models of the 
diachronic processes and the internal temporality of cultures.
The first topic is related to possible theoretical models organizing the 
study of diachronic processes. Although many such models were proposed, 
their multiplicity may be reduced to two “clear” and contesting approach-
es, one deduced from the writings by Febvre1 and the second defended 
by Bloch.2 Febvre, usually siding himself with structural approaches, 
preferred a study of synchronic reconstructions of past phenomena and 
his position became even more attractive under the growing influence of 
Claude Lévi-Strauss’ structural anthropology. Diachrony is introduced 
as a comparative study of synchronic cross-sections, taken in different 
moments of time. In this way, the changes in functioning of both the el-
1 A. F. Grabski, Dzieje historiografii, Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, Poznan 2011.
2 M. Bloch, The Historian’s Craft, Alfred A. Knopf, New York 1953.
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ements of the structure and in the rules of organization are undoubtedly 
recognizable and such a method may even be a preferred way of their 
description. If that’s the virtue of Febvre’s model, its vice, however, is of 
no lesser importance: the comparison of static structures, representing 
different chronological moments, represents the effects of change, but 
not the process of change. This problem was fully recognized by Michel 
Foucault in his study of the “archaeological” method as a general problem 
of structuralism.3 
The minimal requirement would be, then, to supplement the compara-
tive study of synchronic structures with a study of the rules of their trans-
formation. Supplemented in this way, this model would achieve a close 
resemblance to system theories, rooted in the development of semiotics, 
like the theories proposed by Niklas Luhmann4 and Yuri Lotman,5 and 
could implement cybernetic knowledge about the dynamics of systems. 
Still, the necessity of the transition from a study of synchronic structure to 
a study of the rules of transformation seems to depend less on theoretical 
presumptions than on the specifics of the given questionnaire. Simpli-
fying matters a bit, the synchronic and structural approach seems to be 
preferred when scholarly interest is concentrated around a reconstruction 
of the past states of affairs, for example if one is – as Febvre was – asking 
for things like the outillage mental at the time of François Rabelais. The 
situation changes when a questionnaire is built around the problems of 
origins and transformation. Now the comparative study of synchronic 
structures proves to be unacceptably limited. It effectively recognize 
changes, their range and effects, but does poorly in their explanation. The 
change is something that always happens exactly in between the synchronic 
cross-sections, and their comparative study inevitably omits the process 
of change itself. Regardless of determining the chronological point t and 
t’ when synchronic cross-sections are taken, the process of recognized 
change takes place in between t and t’. 
The duality of the synchronic-structural study and diachronic study 
mirrors then the duality in understanding the purposes of history itself: 
the distinction between history as knowledge of the past, aiming for 
a reconstruction of the past and the no longer existing shapes of the 
world, and history as knowledge of change, aiming for the explanation 
3 M. Foucault, Archaeology of Knowledge, Vintage Books, New York 2010.
4 N. Luhmann, Social Systems, Stanford University Press, Stanford 1995.
5 Y. Lotman, Culture and Explosion, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin 2009. 
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of processes and of the relations between humans and time. These two 
concepts of history are neither contradictory nor independent, particu-
larly as history as a theory of change is impossible without history as 
knowledge of the past events. This situation renders Febvre’s idea of the 
comparative study of synchronic cross-sections as a relevant, even if not 
fully sufficient, method of studying changes. But this dependency works 
also in reverse, even if in a less obvious way. Assuming Bloch’s concept of 
the “structural dependency of ages,” it should be emphasized that every 
synchronic cross-section is partially determined by the sociocultural (and 
subjective) world of the researcher, and that the world of the researcher 
and the reconstructed world of the past are intertwined and connected 
by a relation of a diachronic character. Thanks to this, no study of the 
past, regardless of the purity of its synchronic and structural approach, 
is immune to a diachronic construction of the research act itself. This 
may be expressed quite clearly. Let t(h) denote the point in chronology 
occupied by the historian and t(o) the point reconstructed, i.e. the point 
of synchronic cross-section. Any possible historical reconstruction of the 
state of structure S in moment t(o) is determined by the characteristics 
of t(h). The effect of historical reconstruction is not then a description of 
S at t(o) but the image of it, determined by the structural qualities of both 
t(o) and t(h). Therefore, the effect of the reconstruction can be denoted by 
S(o,h). This is how the “structural dependency of ages” works out.
Next to the structural model of diachronic phenomena the second 
model can be described – let’s name it, for now, the genetic model – that 
treats diachrony as a basic historical problem. Usually connected with Marc 
Bloch – opposed in this case to Lucien Febvre – it can be traced back to 
Max Weber and his treatment of history. Based upon the dynamic relations 
between events, this model is mainly concerned with historical causality. 
Both Weber and Bloch noticed immediately that the application of the 
classical concept of causality – as it is explicated by Kmita and assumed in 
Newtonian physics – to historical phenomena fruits in too many troubles. 
From my own point of view I would describe these troubles as follows.
First, in the case of sociocultural phenomena – and historical phenom-
ena are of a sociocultural character – determining the proper classes of 
states of affairs, supposed to be connected by causal relation, is problematic. 
The exemplary utterance “if any event (dynamic state of affairs) belonging 
to the class Revolutions occurs, then an event form the class Terror will 
occur” is susceptible to the previous definitions of revolution and terror – 
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its acceptability depends on the delimitation of these classes of states of 
affairs. In this exemplary utterance both the assumed classes of events are 
unclear and belong to legitimate objects of definitional discussion. The 
utterance can be then defended by the proper construction of the class 
“revolutions,” which excludes the cases when revolution was not followed 
by terror – such a definition of revolution as the “violent change of the 
sociopolitical order resulting in a period of revolutionary terror” could be 
acceptable, even if it turns the previous causal explanation into a tautology. 
And the very same utterance can be undermined by such a definition of 
terror that will exclude many forms of revolutionary violence, for example 
by defining terror as an excess, a violence that is not functionally needed 
for the establishment of new political power. In effect, causal explanations 
in history prove to be mainly a semantic operation and depend more on 
definitional decisions than recognized connections between events.
Second, the classic concept of causality is contradictory to the concept 
of “frame determinations” assumed here. Agreeing that sociocultural 
dependencies are of a frame character, one has to accept a statement that 
the occurrence of an event belonging to a class A causes the occurrence 
of any event belonging to one of the classes B, ..., N. Meticulous historians 
faithful to both their knowledge of source evidence and the concept of 
causal explanation did not hesitate to formulate this consequence. Arnold 
Hauser6 stated – and many historians shared his belief – that in history the 
same causes lead to different effects. True or not, such a statement in fact 
marks the departure from any controllable concept of causality. Causality 
changes form explanation to rhetoric.
Third, causal relations in history are usually established not between 
classes of events but between individual events. (The exception may be 
the purely nomothetic model of history, that one could call “positivist” if 
one wanted to engage oneself in the debate of what exactly the positivist 
vision of history was.) These singular events are often deemed unrepeata-
ble, singular or even idiosyncratic. If this is the case, the individual causal 
relation may be recognized, but without a recognition of causal law or 
regularity. And, of course, if there’s no causal regularity, no test can be 
proposed to check the correctness of a recognized individual causal rela-
tion. This situation seems to be the main reason for the inconclusiveness 
of so many historical debates on “causes” and “effects” (inconclusive de-
6 A. Hauser, The Social History of Art, Routledge, London 1999.
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bate, leading to new discoveries and introducing new evidence, can still 
be fruitful though). We have more examples than we need of debates on 
causes (the cause of the decline and fall of the Imperium Romanum, the 
causes of the Mongolian invasion, causes of the French Revolution and of 
the October Revolution, causes of the partition of Poland, causes of the 
industrial revolution, causes of National Socialism, etc. – or, as one of 
Joseph Heller’s characters puts it, “why Hitler?!”), and debates on effects 
(the effects of the crusade movement, effects of the Norman invasions, 
effects of the Reformation, effects of the Council of Trident, effects of the 
reforms during the reign of Peter I, effects of the 19th century workers 
movement, effects of the Great Depression, etc.). None of these debates 
has been concluded and there’s no risk in predicting that none ever will be.
Partially this is because – and this is my fourth point – even if a causal 
regularity would have been established it still would lack any experimental 
test. There is no need for regret though. One should be comforted by the 
impossibility – in usual circumstances – of experimental revolutions and 
the falls of empires. 
Many problems of this kind may be solved by a concept introduced by 
both Weber and Bloch, regarding “complex causality.” The concept can be 
expressed as a thesis that for any event e within structure S there is always 
a series of necessary conditions c1,...,cn, but there is no singular sufficient 
condition. The hypothetical sufficient condition of e can be understood 
only as a whole series c1,...,cn (ultimately this would be just the state of 
structure S at a given moment). The concept of “complex causality” ex-
plains the inconclusiveness of many historical debates on causes but also 
their usual fruitfulness. Except for mistakes in connecting events, which 
can be and eventually are pointed out, the contest must remain without 
a  winner, because contesting explanations represent complementary 
analyses of different components of complex cause, i.e. they form partial 
analyses of the necessary conditions of a given event. Partiality of this kind 
cannot be comprehended as a vice, as completeness of explanation may be 
impossible to achieve for practical reasons. It is even tempting to say that 
in the explanation of historical causes completeness and conclusiveness is 
a bit, and sometimes not only a bit, iffy. It must be emphasized that in this 
context particular elements of causal series are defined as necessary condi-
tions, while all the purpose of causal explanation in the classical meaning 
is finding out sufficient conditions. Sufficient condition is also the most 
common and general definition of the cause. If the sufficient condition is 
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treated as a complete series of necessary conditions (the state of a given 
structure at a given moment), then the search for the sufficient condition 
of any event must be interpreted as a regulative ideal (in Karl Raimund 
Popper terms7): as a necessary ideal, that organizes any research and allows 
its improvement by critique, regardless of the possibility of its actual reali-
zation. It is, then, a function analogous to one fulfilled by the idea of truth 
in the general construction of scientific knowledge: Popper regarded the 
truth as a regulatory idea of scientific practice, while any actual research is 
evaluated as more or less corroborated. The need for corroboration itself is, 
of course, founded on the regulative activity of truth. By the way, misun-
derstanding in this matter seems to be the main rationale for the effort to 
abandon the very idea of truth, as the truth is not a feature of any actually 
gained knowledge (for dozens of reasons pointed out in the anti-scientific 
philosophy of the last hundred years). We can say then, in a more modest 
way, that the search for sufficient condition is a regulative idea of causal 
explanations in history, regardless of the effect actually gained.
The concept of complex causality provokes also a slightly different 
approach to the problem of general laws in history. From this point of 
view, their function seems also to be above all that is regulative. General 
laws equip historical explanation with normative patterns of possible 
connections between events and logical norms of reasoning. Against the 
traditional nomothetism, then, a historian is not obliged to formulate 
laws of actual empiric content, but against the traditional idiographism 
a historian is not abandoning the idea of scientific law, as he is making 
a  constant recourse to a logical form of a general law. It is this logical 
form that underlies any efforts for historical understanding. Even the 
most vague and uncertain causal explanation, even the most cautious 
search for a singular necessary condition, assumes a logical ordering of 
the utterance by a formal construction of the general law.
The problem of historical causality seems, then, complex enough to pro-
voke a question in Richard Rorty’s style, if it is not “making more trouble 
than it’s worth.” But without the language of causality, historical analysis 
would actually have to limit itself to the description of purely synchronic 
dependencies or even to a catalogue of unrelated singularities. It would be 
even difficult, although not impossible, to supplement synchronic recon-
structions with a study of the rules of structural transformation. Most of 
7 K. R. Popper, Objective Knowledge, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1972.
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the diachronic relations, especially diachronic relations between singular 
events, would be thrown out of the field of explanation. For the history 
of culture, and especially for the history of artistic culture, this would be 
unacceptable, and causal language may be still the only explanatory lan-
guage able to somehow deal with singularity and exceptionality. Why for 
artistic history especially? Theory of culture deals with shared knowledge 
and repeatable regularities of behaviour, it is a grammar of the typical, 
whilst modern Western art is the domain of the untypical, individual and 
unrepeatable – at least in its highest achievements (i.e. achievements social-
ly recognized as the highest). The language of vague necessary conditions 
is also guarding history against a specific reductionism, one opposite to 
the reductionism recognized as a danger, either openly or implicitly, by so 
different scholars as Bloch, Febvre, Braudel, Toynbee, and before them by 
Burckhardt, Droysen or Lamprecht. If they have univocally warned against 
the reduction of history to a set of unrelated facts, to the plane of events – 
infamous “battle-history” – then also an opposite reductionism should 
be named and shamed: the reduction of history to the plane of structural 
organization, eliminating the individuality of an event (an artwork, for 
example). Braudel was not unaware of the dangers connected with this 
kind of reductionism, even if his main interest was placed elsewhere. 
The approach to diachrony that is not simply “adding time” to synchron-
ic structures, but takes time as its starting point is, of course, not limited 
to causal explanation. In the Polish tradition of historical methodology, 
for example in ideas proposed by Jerzy Topolski,8 causal explanations 
have been differentiated from genetic explanations. Not causal, but ge-
netic explanations were pointed out as the “daily bread” of a historian, 
especially the “traditional historian,” relying to a greater or lesser extent 
on the traditions of 19th century German historiography. Genetic expla-
nations, thanks to their often intuitive and theoretically unclear character, 
are much more difficult to formally reconstruct than causal, functional 
or subjective-rational ones. Also, Topolski did not attempt their formal 
characterisation. Generally speaking, genetic explanations are aiming for 
the recognition of the origins of given phenomena, explaining the states 
of affairs in the moment t’ as the consequences of the states of affairs in 
a previous moment t. The nature of the connection between events (causal, 
functional, etc.) is usually not pointed out. Genetic explanations may, then, 
8 J. Topolski, Teoria wiedzy historycznej, Wyd. Poznańskie, Poznan 1983.
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and often do, prepare evidence for other forms of explanation, and the 
doubt about whether they are really explanations at all is not unfounded. 
It’d be more proper to speak about genetic relations as a basis for further 
explanation, though an attempt to change an accepted, at least in Polish, 
terminological habit, goes against all the odds. “Genetic explanations” are, 
then, chronologically ordered sequences of states of affairs (of the different 
chronological states of a given structure), that are suspected to be mutu-
ally related. Recognition of the character of these relations is a matter of 
other explanatory approaches. Therefore “genetic explanations” are always 
introductory and insufficient, while at the same time necessary for further 
research. More often than not, the genetic ordering of events forms a basis 
for causal explanation. The model of historical knowledge based upon this 
classical genetic-causal connection may be generally called a genetic model.
Both structural and genetic models of historical diachrony can be suc-
cessfully defended from the theoretical point of view, and their effective-
ness in explaining actual historical phenomena has been already proven by 
many applications. It’s not surprising that the idea of their unification, less 
as an articulated topic, more as a practical problem of historical research, 
became valid some decades ago. Again, both these approaches influenced 
the concept of diachrony in Braudel’s and Kmita’s propositions, and we 
shall continue their discussion.
Kmita’s main model is transforming the functional and hierarchi-
cal structure, and the basic rules of its transformation are obviously of 
a functional character. The functional change, starting from the functional 
balance, the equilibrium of the structure, going through instability and 
achieving a new equilibrium, was the object of research in anthropology, 
and there’s every reason to assume that Bronisław Malinowski’s9 and 
George Peter Murdock’s10 elaborations of this topic should be also ap-
plied to Kmita’s model. But Kmita differentiates two kinds of functional 
structures, according to their relation to time, namely, synchronic and 
diachronic ones. Synchronic functional structures lack determining con-
nections between non-concurrent states of structure (and/or states of its 
elements). The chronology of the states of structure and states of elements 
is then irrelevant to the explanation of their changes. Diachronic functional 
structures are, oppositely, vulnerable to chronology, and this vulnerability 
can be expressed as a thesis, that non-concurrent states of structure and 
 9 B. Malinowski, The dynamics of Cultural Change: An Inquiry into Race Relations in 
Africa, Yale University Press, New Haven 1965.
10 G. P. Murdock, How Culture Changes, Oxford University Press, New York 1956.
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states of its elements are connected by the relations of determination. In 
diachronic structures non-concurrent states are – in previously elucidated 
meaning – genetically related. 
Within the functional structure though, the genetic determinations lose 
their vagueness: the direction of changes is functionally determined and, 
on the other hand, the frame character of the functional determination 
is limited, although not cancelled, by the genetic factors. As we know, it 
is irrelevant how a given function within the structure is fulfilled, as long 
as it is fulfilled, but the range of possible functional responses is now 
drastically limited by the previous state of the structure and its elements. 
For this reason, functional explanations prove now to be insufficient in 
the case of the diachronic structures and have to be replaced by the more 
complex procedure of a genetic-functional explanation. And sociocultural 
structures are obviously diachronic structures. Kmita’s model effectively 
integrates the structural and genetic approaches in the realm of history. 
The procedure of the genetic-functional explanation can be illustrated 
by the proper interpretation of Max Weber’s11 discourse on protestant 
ethics and the birth of capitalism. In this case – oversimplifying the ex-
ample – the change in the axiological system is caused by the functional 
need of a legitimization for capitalistic economic practices. The religious 
shape of this legitimization is genetically determined by the previous state 
of Weltanschauung, also of a religious character. But to interpret Weber in 
this way is to reverse the order of determination actually assumed by the 
German sociologist. A much better example could be taken from Marx’s 
The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte.12 It’s worth mentioning that 
the methodological analysis of Marx’s explanatory strategy in this article 
led Gerald Cohen,13 as far as I know independently from Kmita, to the 
very same model of genetic-functional explanation, incorporated then 
to the methodological basis of the analytical Marxism propagated by the 
September Group. Also Marvin Harris, characterizing the importance of 
Karl Marx for anthropological theory, names his explanatory approach 
as “diachronical functionalism.”14 
11 M. Weber, The protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Courier Dover Publi-
cations, New York 2003.
12 K. Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, Mondial, New York 2005.
13 G. Cohen, Karl Marx’s Theory of History: A Defense, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton 2000.
14 M. Harris, The Rise of Anthropological Theory: A History of Theories of Culture. Up-
dated Edition, Altamira Press, Walnut Creek 2001.
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Braudel’s version of approaching the relation between structural and 
genetic elements in history differs from those solutions based on Marx’s 
tradition and this is connected with his more than famous conception of 
the multiplicity of historical durations. There are two, undoubtedly correct, 
observations that found this conception. First, structural regularities in 
history are identifiable with respect to great scales of observation, both 
socially and chronologically; second, historical events taken in all their 
individuality, seem to not follow any identifiable grammar or structural 
rule (and, I would add, different scales of observation lead to different, 
nomothetic and idiographic, philosophies of history). And there’s also an 
educated intuition, that nevertheless the structural plane of history and the 
plane of events have to be connected – somehow – but for sure reciprocally. 
Braudel15 differentiated three forms of historical duration, although 
sometimes he referred to the fourth form of the “longest duration.” Pro-
cesses of long duration, lasting for centuries or even longer, are charac-
terized by a slow rate of changes and for this reason are often perceived as 
constant factors, datum out of history and a basis for more rapid processes. 
Observation on the great chronological scale discovers the mutability of 
these processes, overlooked by the hasty history of events. Structural reg-
ularities are found on this plane, forming, so to say, a skeleton of history, 
a structural frame for processes of less visible or invisible regularities. In 
this specific meaning, Braudel could name his own position a “structur-
alism,” based upon the study of long durations and highly independent 
from the linguistic and ethnological structuralism. 
The second plane of historical duration is processes of medium du-
ration, including cycles and tendencies lasting for decades (down to the 
so called “secular tendency”). They articulate the processes of long dura-
tion, but preserve a kind of autonomy, as – characteristic of the medium 
duration – they cannot be simply derived from structures of long dura-
tion. Braudel tended to consider the medium duration as the next plane 
of regularities, even of regular cycles, undoubtedly under the influence of 
the economic theories proposed by François Simiand, but cycles can be 
reasonably researched only for quantifiable states of affairs, like an increase 
and decrease in prices and wages or demographic changes. It’s much harder 
to propose any acceptable criteria for establishing cycles in, for example, 
changes within cultural knowledge. The reasons for these difficulties are 
15 F. Braudel, On History, Chicago University Press, Chicago 1982.
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exactly the same as in the previously analyzed case of function explanation 
in the humanities: to speak responsibly about the cyclic character of any 
process, one must be able to describe the changes of a given element as 
a function of time. 
Lastly, we have those processes of short duration or simply events, 
where regularities are observable only if a given event is considered as 
a symptom of processes of the long or medium durations. Both the long 
and medium duration can exist only as a relatively long sets of events and 
are accessible only by the study of such sets. The history of the long dura-
tion doesn’t then cease to be a history of events, but changes the hierarchy 
of their importance. In the perspective of the long duration – and not by 
some enmity toward political history – the introduction of potatoes to the 
British Isles is a much more important event than the battle of Lepanto. 
The short duration appears then to be a heterogenic conglomerate of struc-
turally determined events and contingencies, “events-comets,” that cannot 
be easily derived from long lasting structures, but are still explainable by 
a recourse to human values, motivations, etc. (and occupy the attention 
of everyday witnesses and makers of history). 
Here lies the challenge of historical analysis: the historian is always 
confronted with a seemingly chaotic and uncoordinated set of events, 
which do not manifest their relation to structures. The observation on 
large chronological scale seems to be the only remedy, requiring, amongst 
other things, a vast erudition (under a threat of changing the “large scale” 
into a large oversimplification). The main focus of Braudel’s conception 
is, I think, not a simple differentiation of historical durations, but a study 
of  the dependencies between them. Events do not simply articulate 
structures and cycles, they create them. The long duration itself cannot 
be comprehended otherwise than as a long series of related events, or the 
theory of long duration will turn into metaphysics of a poor quality. The 
matters complicate: all forms of the historical duration constitute each 
other and require simultaneous study (notice how important in Braudel’s 
study of long duration is the example or even the anecdote). This complex 
and dense web of dependencies between processes of different duration is 
what Braudel called – with yet another meaning – the dialectics of history.
Introducing or not the plane of the “longest duration” is probably less 
important than it could seem, as the exact disposition of levels of dura-
tion is mainly a heuristic matter. Nobody is assuming here that history 
is “actually” happening on many chronological levels. What is assumed 
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here is that historical changes and processes are happening at a different 
tempo, and simplifying this into three or four levels is useful as a tool of 
historical analysis. This tool can be modified or perfected according to 
analytical needs.
The models proposed by Kmita and Braudel are not contradictory, but 
the latter has an important advantage: it does not cancel the diversity of 
possible historical relations to only one type of them (which was already 
discussed here), allowing a rich and sophisticated analysis, including the 
type of relation considered by Kmita as a rational-subjective determi-
nation, and introduced as a motivational explanation in the analytical 
philosophy of history.
But even the theoretical model of a multi-durational, interactive di-
achronic structure is not sufficient to properly deal with the problem of 
diachrony. In every historical discourse diachronic dependencies between 
events are constructed not only by cognitive models and explanatory 
procedures, but also thanks to forming a strength of the narrative. Many 
authors, including Arthur C. Danto16 and Jerzy Topolski, demonstrated, 
often independently, that every effort of relating each event to another, in 
opposition to noting down their occurrence, involves a narrative utterance, 
connecting at least two different chronological points. This is the differ-
ence dividing a historical record and a chronicle in Topolski’s terms. Even 
accepting the possibility of history expressed in a medium other than lan-
guage – and there are historical phenomena, like past soundscapes, which 
may privilege other media – the explanation will still remain a matter of 
language. The results of quantitative or serial history, for instance, may 
be presented as tables and diagrams, but their explanation will involve 
linguistic utterances, and narrative remains the main form of representing 
diachrony in language. 
I don’t claim here that it’s impossible to omit the narrativist philosophy 
of history, but I do claim that no history can omit a narrative organiza-
tion of utterance. Paul Ricoeur aptly named narrative the basic form of 
articulating the human experience of temporality. As long as history is 
dealing with time – and time, Braudel once said, “sticks to historian’s 
thoughts as the sand to a shovel” – the historical knowledge will have to 
rely on the narrative. Narrative ordering of any linguistic representation 
16 A. C. Danto, Analytical Philosophy of History, Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge 1968.
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of the simplest diachronic sequence, and the dependency of other forms 
of representing the past on language for any explanatory effort, assures 
an introductory understanding of history, of “people in time.” Putting it 
otherwise: every explanatory model of history (structural, functional, 
genetic or any other) relies upon the previous ordering of diachronic 
dependencies by a linguistic form of the narrative.
The relevance of the theory of historical diachrony for a particular 
field of history of culture is direct and partially self-explanatory. Every 
possible cultural image of the world and every possible configuration 
of normative-directival knowledge, or simply every possible culture in 
its connection to the whole of civilization, may be reconstructed syn-
chronically if that is what is required by the scholar’s questionnaire. But 
still every culture, every human affair in fact, is temporal and always, 
before it becomes an object of scientific explanation, already narrated. 
On the basis of the narrative knowledge many complementary theories 
of historical diachrony can be built, and probably many should be built, 
as the diachronic structure of civilization seems rather complex. Is, then, 
a unified model of diachrony even required? Without doubt, integrity is 
a theoretical virtue, but uniting existing models of diachrony would be 
placed on the verge of eclecticism, as for different topics different models 
prove to be effective. The web of temporal relations within civilization is 
dense and intricate; there’s no reason to limit ourselves to only one path.
But still there’s more to the complicacy of historical and cultural di-
achrony. Cultural images of the world more often than not include the 
image of history and of temporal relations and this image itself is a valid 
topic of historical research. The topic is hardly covered by the traditional 
opposition of res gestae and res rerum gestarum, although cultural images 
of history belong to the latter. In the perspective of all the previous con-
siderations this differentiation cannot be interpreted as the opposition 
of “real” historical events and their historiographic representation: it is 
rather the difference between what is being constructed (res gestae) and 
the tools of construction (res rerum gestarum). The set of intellectual tools 
used to construct the representation of the past is, of course, a part of 
culture and may organize, to different extents and in different ways, not 
only the professional practices of historians, but also the social frame of 
imagining and experiencing the past. The specifics of this situation can be 
properly interpreted by a slightly artificial, but useful distinction between 
history and “historicality.” “Historicality” would denote the conceptual 
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frame – belonging to a cultural image of the world – for organizing, or-
dering, narrating, understanding and experiencing the diachrony by the 
members of a given society. As many configurations of such a frame can 
be recognized, we can speak about the different modes of historicality. 
I would think about the modes of historicality as belonging to the cate-
gorial sphere of world-images.
Different modes of historicality may gain the support of members of 
the same society and in effect historicality may become the next place 
of sociocultural competition. For example, in the Western historiography 
of the last few decades we can observe the contest between the models 
of historical continuity and discontinuity, both rooted in much older 
narratives. I have already had a chance to present my position on this 
topic elsewhere, and here I’m going to only point out some of the most 
important observations as an illustration. Even the definitions of historical 
continuity and discontinuity are difficult, because both these concepts are 
metaphors based upon projecting mathematical terms onto the realm 
of the unquantifiable. There is, of course, nothing metaphorical in the 
distinction of mathematical functions of continuous and discontinuous 
input, with linear functions as an example of the former and trigonomet-
ric functions of the tangent and cotangent, of the latter. Also in history 
phenomena can be recognized as continuous or discontinuous, without 
a recourse to metaphor, only if they can be represented by a corresponding 
mathematical function (as for example the changes of prices and wages 
can). Again, we encounter the already all too familiar problems of function 
explanation in the social sciences and humanities. Metaphors or not, the 
concepts of historical continuity and discontinuity belong to the forms 
of narrating the past in actual human practices, and even if they do not 
seem to be best suited as tools of explanation, they still are a valid object 
of explanation. They belong to researched cultures. To understand them 
better, it’s important to precisely reconstruct their meaning. 
Let us start with an observation that historical phenomena are usually 
considered to be “continuous” when they can be explained by a recourse 
to the structural regularities of the unit in concern, and they are called 
“discontinuous” when such a recourse does not support any sufficient ex-
planation. This leads to some consequences. First, the very same phenom-
ena may be considered both continuous and discontinuous respectively to 
the construction of the unit of research. A famous catastrophe provides 
us with a proper example. The earthquake in Lisbon on 1 November 1755 
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shook not only the life of Portugal and the city itself, but also the moral 
and religious beliefs of many educated Europeans, mainly the French (and, 
as Bertrand Russell has put it, the faith of Voltaire). In the interpretational 
perspective of the French deists and atheists it was truly a catastrophe, an 
unpredictable event coming from outside and not explicable in terms of 
meaningful historical relations – a classic example of historical disconti-
nuity. And the earthquake in Lisbon actually “intervened form outside,” as 
long as we remain within economic, social or cultural history. Regularities 
of social and economic structure do not explain this event, so it appears 
to be arbitrary and indetermined, but violently changing “from outside” 
researched structures. For a historian of religious beliefs in the 18th century 
the earthquake – although not its interpretations – is an abruption. But 
a geologist constructs and delimitates his field of research differently. In 
his perspective, thanks to his reference to a differently delimited structure, 
the earthquake of Lisbon is completely comprehensible, explainable thanks 
to a recourse to structural regularities and belongs to the continuous 
realm of the history of the Earth. Historical continuity and discontinuity 
then depend on the outillage mental and form modes of historicality; 
they can’t be found in the “events themselves.” The debate on historical 
abruption and continuity, which so strongly opposed Braudel’s theory of 
long duration and Foucault’s concept of the “archaeology of knowledge,” 
seems then to be a debate on Weltanshauung, not only on the methods of 
dealing with diachrony.
The second consequence is that if this is the situation, then methodi-
cal research on the modes of historicality must be postulated along with 
a study of their meaning in organizing the historical discourse, as historical 
discourse proves now to be itself shaped by contesting cultural images of 
the world. Matters of historical continuity and discontinuity do not exhaust 
the problem of the modes of historicality. In the field of the history of music 
for example, the ground is already solidly prepared. Conceptualizing the 
problem of modes of historicality in different terminology – Jean-François 
Lyotard’s terminology of master narratives – Richard Taruskin gathered 
abundant evidence and started the interpretation.17 Basing on his more 
than impressive study, at least a few such modes, organized by narrative 
schemes or central metaphors, can be pointed out in the literate musical 
17 R. Taruskin, The Oxford History of Western Music, vol. 3, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford – New York 2010.
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culture of the West, their origins explained and their contests traced. There 
is, then, the powerful metaphor of the “new beginning,” traceable to the 
early Christian concept of Cantica nova, through the rhetoric of the 14th 
century Ars nova and the enthusiastic reception of John Dunstable’s mu-
sica voluptuosa in 15th century continental Europe, up to the 20th century 
conceptualizations of electronic music. There is a “narrative of repetition” 
observable in the complex effort to repeat the effects of musica antica and 
the Platonic concept of melody, undertaken by some Italian composers 
connected with Florence Camerata at the threshold of the 16th and 17th 
centuries and underlying the no less complex efforts of the Benedictines 
of Solesme to restore the original liturgical chant of the Roman Catho-
lic Church. There is a narrative of culminating perfection, based upon 
metaphors of continuity and exemplified by the 16th century concept of 
Ars perfecta and by centuries of composers’ emulation practices. There is 
a narrative of progress and development, of Hegelian origins and founded 
by the influential Neue Deutsche Schule, and active throughout many 
forms of musical modernism. And there are probably some more, although 
undoubtedly less central. The historicality of Western literate music may 
be, then, described as a network of different contesting and cooperating 
modes. The analysis of this interplay requires a separate book. Here, I’m 
just taking the opportunity to illustrate a theoretical topic with historical 
material that comes from my personally favoured field of research. 
Towards conclusions
During all the considerations presented so far, as the reader will have 
undoubtedly noticed, the terms “explanation” and “understanding” have 
been used in somewhat a liberal way, sometimes even interchangeably. 
This chosen tactic perhaps requires some justification at last. The debate on 
explanation and understanding in history and all the humanities, a century 
old now and connected with Wilhelm Dilthey’s opposition of Naturwis-
senschaften and Geisteswissenschaften, Johann Windelband’s opposition of 
the nomothetic and idiographic sciences, Max Weber’s idea of Verstehende 
Soziologie, and later, the hermeneutic philosophy of Hans-Georg Gadamer 
and Paul Ricoeur, is vast and rich. Trying to follow its history here would 
be pointless, especially if we remember that the debate is not closed, and 
important voices and additions still appear, to mention only Georg Henrik 
von Wright’s writings.1 All that can be done on these pages is to support 
the reader with a clarification of the point assumed here.
Three forms of scientific explanation, well defined in their logical 
structure, have been in this work introduced as postulated in the history 
of culture: the causal, functional-genetic, and subjective-rational explana-
tions (the latter being very close to the motivational explanations proposed 
in the analytical philosophy of history after Hempel). They do not need 
to be discussed again. These three procedures would be recognized by 
Dilthey and others as classic examples of explanation, as they all assume 
a logical form of a general law (the presumption of rationality fulfils this 
function in the case of the subjective-rational explanation). Still, we have 
found a peculiar trait of their usage in history: they serve as logical forms 
1 G. H. von Wright, Explanation and Understanding, Cornell University Press, Ithaca 
2004.
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organizing the possible connection between states of affairs (for example 
allowing to construct causal chains), while more often than not they do 
not lead to a formulation of empirically specific laws: causal relations 
between singular events are recognized regardless of the formulation of 
any empirically non-empty causal law. The events in history cannot be 
subdued to any particular law (and are then not considered to be particular 
cases of general regularity) but only to a logical form of the law. The idea 
of law becomes more heuristic than empirical. In a few words, general 
laws as patterns of reasoning logically organize the historical discourse.
But also other components of historical comprehension were system-
atically emphasized, with components rendering a purely explanatory 
or the “scientists” models of history insufficient. The necessity of using 
narrative to represent the diachronic dependency of events within any 
linguistic discourse was pushed so far that Ricoeur’s thesis on narrative 
as a fundamental form of the human understanding of temporality has 
been openly admitted. No narrative, though, is cognitively neutral or 
transparent. Narrative representation includes literary means, stylistic, 
poetic and rhetoric which were the object of Hayden White’s research 
in the 1970s. Thanks to various literary strategies, the narrative not only 
diachronically organizes the representation of events, but also equips it 
with introductory interpretations, establishing connections and engaging 
the reader in certain modes of historical perception, or at least suggests 
interpretational approaches. In this way or another, the narrative is always 
already a form of historical comprehension. 
Explanation then, unlike in Dilthey’s concept, is a procedure, or better, 
a set of procedures, that is applied to a reality already ordered and com-
prehended by the narrative. Explanation is not reserved for the natural 
sciences; it appears now as a specific method of extending our under-
standing of history, a different entrance, in philosophical terms, into the 
hermeneutic circle. 
If historical explanation depends on the given narrative, it is then also 
dependant on the forms of aesthetic representation, always present in any 
narrative. Some interpreters have tried to reduce history to this aesthetic 
element, but even if such a reduction is not acceptable in confrontation 
with the actual practice of historians, many considerations on the relation 
between history and aesthetics remain valid. They were proposed by au-
thors as radically different as Johan Huizinga, Hayden White and Frank 
Ankersmit. As long as history is reported in language, this connection 
cannot be neglected.
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Historical cognition forms, then, a nexus of narrative and an aesthetic 
representation of the past, and scientific explanation, the latter based on the 
introductory work of the former, but itself more often than not also pre-
sented in the form of narrative. Neither scientific procedures nor aesthetic 
representation is able to do justice to history while isolated each from the 
other. Such isolation seems arbitrary and ideologically committed either 
to “scientism” or – so popular in the recent times of postmodernism – to 
an enmity toward science. Unluckily, it is less committed to actual history. 
Max Weber described history as a hybrid. In this case being a hybrid is 
not a vice, it is a specific of historical cognition, that by the way made the 
“scientist” and “humanistic” reductions of history equally possible, equally 
founded in properly chosen aspects of history – and equally incorrect. If 
one should speak about a cognitive hybrid or about an ontologically unified 
and original structure of comprehension is the matter of philosophical 
debate, crucial to understanding the character of human knowledge, but 
of probably lesser practical consequences for the historical research. The 
effects achieved by this hybrid discourse can be generalized in the form 
of mobile theoretical models instead of the elucidation of laws. I can’t find 
any better term to name a historical cognition in general than “under-
standing.” Such understanding does not oppose, but includes explanation.
The debate on the scientific character of history (or anthropology, or 
musicology, or art history, or sociology, or any other discipline in English 
classified usually as a part of the social sciences or the humanities) has 
been going on for over a century now and, at least in Poland, became 
“hardwired” into the thinking of any historian or cultural theoretician. 
During the debate, the term “science” was in fact reserved for the nat-
ural and sometimes the formal sciences, although this is a decision far 
from attaining universal convention, specific to English terminology, but 
forced today by some organizational changes in the non-English speaking 
countries. Of course, no English-speaker would describe most of history 
with the term “science,” but other languages carry, well, different cultural 
images of the world. There is no reason to privilege one connected with 
English. German, Italian, Russian, French or Polish linguistic habits, 
connected with different socially accepted images of social practices, treat 
their equivalent of the English word “science” (rough equivalents, as we 
can see) in diversified ways. If history is a science then, it is a matter of 
semantics and of... the history of culture.
But there’s more to this than semantics. Name it science or scholarship, 
but this field forms a distinctive type of social practice, even if differently 
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conceptualized. Karol Berger,2 modifying the conception proposed by 
Alasdair MacIntyre, elucidated a concept of social practice based not only 
on the social division of labour, but also on patterns of perfection, ascribed 
to different practices. Although he doesn’t explicitly mention ascribed 
regulative ideas, in following the analyses of artistic practices, Berger 
makes also such ideas the object of research. Science as a form of social 
practice can be characterized in a similar way: not only by method and 
logical procedures, as neopositivist philosophers of science tried to utilise, 
but by its regulative ideas (following Karl Raimund Popper, of course) and 
the means of connecting them with procedures. We have two such ideas 
to choose from: the regulative idea of truth, pointed out by Popper, and 
the regulative idea of technological effectiveness, proposed by Jerzy Kmita. 
According to Kmita, they are not contradictory: technological effectiveness 
functionally connects science with the rest of sociocultural structure, while 
the idea of truth regulates subjectively the practices of scientists. In terms 
of technological effectiveness, there’s no place for the theory and history of 
culture in the realm of science. But there’s also very limited space for some 
parts of mathematics or astrophysics. The popular saying “where there’s no 
patent, there’s no science” throws not only the humanities out of science. 
But as long as we define science not in terms of function, but in terms of 
socially recognized meaning, by a recourse to the regulative idea of truth, 
cultural theory and history may well remain within the field of science, as 
long as they accept the discipline of truth. Philosophical problems with 
the very idea of truth are less important in this case than it would seem at 
first glance, not even an agreement of scholars on the elucidation of this 
idea is actually necessary. Agreement on a shared, common goal suffices 
enough, even if the goal itself would be deemed practically unreachable. 
This differs the field of science from other human practices but also from 
the “science of scientism” (and English linguistic custom), where science 
was limited to a set of procedures and logical patterns acceptable for 
a given philosopher (yes, philosopher: such an idea of science remained 
a postulate of philosophy, actual sciences, even physics, were never pure 
enough, up to the moment when Paul K. Feyerabend lost his nerves and 
wrote Against Method). Science as the practice of an intersubjectivelly 
controllable searching for truth crosses at last the inherited dichotomies 
of the 19th and early 20th century. It includes the humanities, as long as 
2 K. Berger, A Theory of Art, Oxford University Press, New York 1999.
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they share the same central value. Those humanities that follow different 
aims – and of course we do not lack such humanities – still should be 
classified elsewhere. The practice of the theory and history of culture as 
described here belongs, I believe, to the broadened field of science.
It’s time to shortly sum up all the previous considerations. The histo-
ry of culture is, then, a scientific approach to the temporality of human 
cultures, i.e. systems of socially shared knowledge, consisting of cultural 
images of the world and normative-directival knowledge, in their mutual 
connections with other dimensions of social existence: the social structure, 
geographic environment, etc. All previous definitions and remarks should 
be repeated here. If such a history is being regulated by a questionnaire 
including questions on structural dependencies and the dynamics of 
change – as it usually has been during the last hundred years – it contains 
an implied theory of culture that we have tried to reconstruct here and 
confront with some other propositions. Such a history of culture can be 
justly called a theoretical one, as it also is a necessary field of validation 
for any cultural theory. Not every history of culture must be theoretical 
and theoretical history is not necessarily privileged: different questions 
demand different approaches and strategies. But every theory of culture 
must be historical, under a threat of being cognitively empty, and cultur-
al theory, as we hopefully have seen, has much to gain by including the 
effects achieved by historians.
As was mentioned at the beginning, I am particularly and personally 
interested in the consequence of history-theory threshold for researches 
concentrated on musical cultures. The history of artistic culture is obvi-
ously a part of the history of culture itself, and a proper questionnaire can 
turn it into a theoretical history just the same. The separate discourse in this 
regard is unnecessary, the only effort needed is a proper delimitation of the 
field of research, i.e. the musical culture itself. Traditionally, for Alan P. 
Merriam for example,3 musical culture in general can be defined as a set 
of regularities in the human usage of sound. John Blacking even defined 
music as “humanly organized sound.”4 But everything that was presented 
in this work leads to the conclusion that behavioural regularities in music 
making can be “ideatively” represented as a set of normative and directival 
3 A. P. Merriam, The Anthropology of Music, Northwestern University Press, Evanston 
1964.
4 J. Blacking, How musical is Man, University of Washington Press, Seattle – London 
1973.
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judgements, regulating the musical practice. These norm and directives, 
as any cultural norms and directives, find their place within a certain 
fragment of a cultural image of the world (in ways already considered at 
length). It’s impossible to determine a priori how big a fragment of the 
cultural image of the world must be considered as important for making 
music. The historian of, for example, the 20th century serial music could 
potentially limit himself only to the world of aesthetic ideas, while the 
historian of liturgical music, dance music or of music in a magical society 
would have to include much bigger fragments if not the virtual entirety 
of their world-image. The part of the cultural image of the world directly 
relating to music and representing it as a numerical harmony of the uni-
verse or the rhetorical art of affections or aesthetically autonomous system 
of sounds, is always connected with the rest of the image by various links.
The history of musical culture is, then, a specific perspective, assumed 
within the general history of culture. Only the emphasis shifts. Cultural 
knowledge surrounding music, as any cultural knowledge, is interwoven 
in social practices and inexplicable when isolated. All the problems of 
the connections between cultural, social, economical and geographical 
factors and of internal diversity and conflicts preserve their validity in 
this particular field. This kind of history of musical culture has the addi-
tional virtue of being in full agreement with the theoretical utterances and 
methodological approaches assumed by ethnomusicologists, starting with 
Merriam up to the current formulations proposed by Jeff Todd Titon.5 The 
coincidence is especially strong in the case of the cognitive anthropology 
of music as practiced by Hugo Zemp or Steven Field, but obviously new 
topics, determined by the specifics of the tradition of Western literate 
music, do also appear. The history of musical culture can be imagined 
as a kind of historical anthropology or “ethnomusicology of Western art 
music,” as postulated, among others, by John Blacking.
The history of musical culture is, of course, intensively practiced and 
doesn’t need to be postulated. It formed the basis of the scholarly program 
of American New Musicology. But if Joseph Kerman,6 Susan McClary7 
5 J. T. Titon (ed.), Worlds of Music. An Introduction to the Music of the World’s Peoples, 
Schirmer Cengage Learning, Belmont 2009.
6 J. Kerman, Contemplating Music: Challenges to Musicology, Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge 2009.
7 S. McClary, Feminine Endings: Music, Gender and Sexuality, University of Minne-
sota Press, Minneapolis 2002.
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and many others managed to break away from the naturalistic, transcen-
dental and formal models of conceptualizing music to the social, cultural 
and historical point of view, they remained dependant on interpretational 
models and a general epistemological assumption on the form of thinking 
usually labelled as “postmodernism.” Their “interpretational anarchism” 
and often arbitrary choices of cultural context (one needs to mentions only 
McClary’s The blasphemy of talking politics during Bach year 8) provoked 
criticism. The criticism is two-folded. The positions rejecting the very 
idea of a sociocultural explanation of musical practices, represented for 
example by Pieter C. van den Toorn,9 can be safely left without response 
as an ideology. Music is something made by human beings, and the idea 
that human practices and their products can somehow be independent 
from the sociocultural conditions with which humans are acting is im-
possible to accept in the light of everything that we know thanks to the 
social sciences and history. Declaring such dependencies as existing but 
ultimately irrelevant to an explanation of musical practices could be even 
justly called an intellectual monstrosity. But there is also a criticism aiming 
to correct the naiveties and errors of New Musicology, while following its 
methodological and historical program, by introducing proper scholarly 
discipline. I would connect this position with Richard Taruskin’s approach. 
And – a good reason for optimism – this kind of criticism was warmly 
welcomed. 
And what with “mentality,” the first and forgotten topic of this text? The 
true history of mentality, and the French history of mentality which was 
identified as mainly the history of culture, could be something more. This 
“more” is of a truly psychological and, sooner or later, neurophysiological 
character, mediating between homo symbolicus and the human being as 
a biological organism. This mediation appears now as one of the greatest 
challenges for science. Here this problem will be left open. The conceptual 
systems of both the natural sciences and the humanities may be internally 
coherent, but the logical relations between them make any mediation 
problematic, as it was described by Florian Znaniecki, Jerzy Kmita, Don-
ald Davidson and others. This conceptual duality is much more difficult 
to reconcile than the dualism of social function and subjective meaning.
8 R. Leppert, S. McClary (eds.), Music and Society: The Politics of Composition, Perfor-
mance and Reception, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1987.
9 P. C. van den Toorn, Music, Politics, and the Academy, University of California Press, 
Berkeley – Los Angeles 1995.
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